

In-House Transactions in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: Matching Outcome or Strategic Promotion?*

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Abstract

This paper examines to what extent agents' strategic incentives explain in-house transactions for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage. We construct an agent-intermediated search model that predicts both strategically-promoted and matching-based in-house transactions. Taking these predictions to home transaction data, we find that agents are more likely to promote internal listings when they are financially rewarded and such effect becomes weaker when consumers are more aware of agents' incentives. We further develop a structural model and find that about one third of in-house transactions are explained by agents' strategic promotion, causing significant utility loss for homebuyers.

Keywords: incentive misalignment, real estate brokerage, in-house transaction, agent-intermediated search, structural estimation

JEL classification: C35, C51, L85, R31

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1 Introduction

Over 80% home buyers and sellers carry out their transactions with the assistance of licensed real estate agents. Yet concerns persist that the misalignment between the goals of agents and those of their clients can cause a loss in consumers' benefit. For example, recent studies have shown that the current commission structure leads real estate agents to leave their own homes on the market longer and sell at a higher price, compared to homes they sell for their clients (e.g., Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas, 2005; Levitt and Syverson, 2008a). A phenomenon that is equally important for understanding incentive issues and their implications for market efficiencies but has received much less attention is in-house transactions, that is, transactions for which buyers and sellers are represented by the same brokerage office.

In-house transactions account for about 20% of home transactions in North American markets. In theory, in-house transactions could create information efficiency and reduce transaction costs, leading to an efficient match between home buyers and sellers. However, it is also possible that agents may promote in-house transactions for their own financial interest. In particular, since matching internal listings with internal buyers helps clear inventories faster and increase the chance of securing both ends of a transaction, brokerage firms often pay a higher commission to reward agents engaged in in-house transactions (Gardiner, Heisler, Kallberg, and Liu, 2007). Quite naturally, these in-house transactions reflect agents' strategic interest, creating a distortion in the home transaction process that benefits agents rather than home buyers and sellers. In this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature by examining the extent to which strategic in-house transactions occur and further assessing their welfare impact on the efficiencies of home matching.

Strategic in-house transactions, if present, have at least two deleterious effects on home buyers and sellers. First, in the search stage, real estate agents may misguide buyers (sellers) by directing their interest to internal listings (buyers), resulting in a suboptimal choice for consumers. Second, in the negotiation stage, an apparent conflict of interest arises from having the same agency represent both

buyers and sellers, making it impossible for the agency to help one party without hurting the other. For these reasons, many jurisdictions in North America have now introduced disclosure requirements for dual agency in order to help consumers avoid unintended dual agency relationship. The legislation requires brokerages and agents to inform both buyers and sellers about the nature of dual agency relationship in writing.

In order to understand the potential importance of the strategic issues involved in in-house transactions, we present an empirical analysis that examines the presence and the extent of agents' strategic promotion in the home search stage and evaluates the welfare consequence of the disclosure policies for home buyers. To motivate our empirical strategy, we first construct an agent-intermediated search model that has three key ingredients. The first is search costs: each buyer has an idiosyncratic valuation for each house which can be learned through costly search. The second is the information advantage enjoyed by real estate agents relative to buyers with high search costs. The third is a promotion bonus that agents receive from their affiliated firms for selling listings originated from the same firm.

In an environment with these three ingredients, two types of in-house transactions naturally arise: *matching-based* and *strategically-promoted*. In the first case, a buyer may purchase an internal listing because the listing yields the highest utility for the buyer. This could be due to the information advantages and transaction efficiencies associated with in-house transactions. For example, agents affiliated with a brokerage firm may be believed to possess superior information about both sides of a certain market segment, permitting them to provide a better and quicker match for a buyer and a seller.

However, in-house transactions can also occur for incentive rather than efficiency reasons. When agents are financially rewarded by their brokerage firms for selling internal listings, the information advantage of agents relative to their clients may compound incentive conflicts, making it possible for cooperating agents (i.e., buyers' agents) to influence buyers' choice by directing their interest to

internal listings first, resulting in a suboptimal match. However, the impact of strategic promotions should be weaker when clients are more informed about agents' incentives.

To test these implications, we utilize a rich dataset that covers one third of properties transacted through the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) in a large North American metropolitan area from 2001 to 2009. The dataset has three appealing features. First, it contains detailed information about house characteristics, neighborhood information, listing and transaction prices, as well as real estate brokerage firms on both sides of a transaction. Second, it includes properties that have been transacted multiple times, which allows us to control for unobserved house characteristics. Third, the sample period covers a natural experimental opportunity permitted by a new legislation (Real Estate and Business Brokerages Act – referred to as “REBBA” hereafter) that requires agents engaged in in-house sales to inform their clients about the dual agency relationship in writing.

Exploiting these unique data, we first estimate a reduced-form model of in-house transactions to test the presence of strategic promotion. Our estimation strategy is akin to a difference-in-differences approach. We first exploit differences in commission structures. Specifically, agents in a traditional brokerage firm give their firm a predetermined ratio (usually 40-60%) of their commission revenue on the per-transaction basis. Full commission brokerage firms, on the other hand, allow their agents to retain 100% of commission revenues but require fixed amount of upfront fees instead (Munneke and Yavas, 2001). The revenues from the traditional brokerage firms strictly increase with the number of either end of transactions, and hence, these firms are more likely to offer their agents higher bonuses for promoting in-house sales (Conner, 2010). Such promotion bonus would be particularly attractive for cooperating agents if commission fees they receive from listing agents are lower than the market rate. Thus, we expect that cooperating agents working for traditional brokerage firms are more likely to engage in in-house transactions, and that this effect is stronger if the commission rate offered by the listing agent is lower. However, these effects alone can be problematic, as the commission structure/rate could endogenously vary with the degree of matching efficiency involved in in-house

transactions. Possibly, houses listed with different commission rates could have different distribution of true quality. Similarly, brokers working for firms with different commission policies could have different distribution of skills and motivations.

To identify the presence of strategic in-house transactions, we then examine differences in the incidence of in-house transactions for agents with different commission incentives before and after the implementation of the REBBA. Presumably, by making consumers more informed about the agency relationship and related incentive issues, the REBBA policy constrains agents' ability to promote internal listings, while leaving other types of in-house transactions unaffected. Thus, the identification in our model does not require the commission rates or split structure to be exogenous. Instead, it relies on the assumption that no other commission related factors differentially affect the incidence of in-house transactions at the same time as the REBBA was implemented. To show this is indeed the case, we control for a large number of time-varying house and brokerage observable characteristics. We also include the interaction of house fixed effects with the REBBA and the interaction of brokerage fixed effects with the REBBA to control for possible time-variation in unobservable house and brokerage characteristics that may be correlated with commission variables.

Our reduced-form results show that cooperating agents are more likely to engage in in-house transactions when they split the commission fees with firms on the per-transaction basis. This effect is stronger when they receive less compensation from listing agents. More importantly, such effects are substantially weakened after the introduction of the REBBA. Together, these results are highly in line with the theoretical predictions, hence providing strong evidence for the presence of strategic in-house transactions. These results are robust to a rich set of controls. By further including brokerage fixed effects interacted with housing market segment fixed effects, we also show that these patterns are unlikely to be explained by brokerage specialization either in geographical areas or in price segments.

In light of the reduced-form evidence for strategic promotion, we further attempt to quantify the extent of strategic versus efficient in-house transactions, and evaluate the welfare consequence

of strategic in-house transactions before and after the REBBA. This calls for structural estimation, because matching efficiencies are generally unobserved and hard to quantify. The key idea of our structural approach is as follows: for a given buyer, her decision on whether purchasing an internal listing (e.g., a house listed by the buyer's agent affiliated office) reflects the difference between the net utility that she obtains from internal versus external listings and the net cost that she incurs when searching for internal versus external listings. If her cooperating agent strategically promote internal listings, such promotion would artificially increase the buyer's cost of searching for external listings. Thus, to the extent that the idiosyncratic matching values for internal and external listings can be estimated, we can recover the implicit costs that the agent may impose on the buyer for searching external listings.

To this end, we first use a nonparametric hedonic approach developed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) to recover the unobserved house characteristic and buyer-specific preferences for house characteristics. We then exploit econometric matching techniques (e.g., Heckman, et al. 1997, 1998) to recover the idiosyncratic match value that a buyer obtains from internal listings as well as from external listings. This enables us to estimate the implicit cost that buyers incur when shopping for external versus internal listings. To identify part of the cost that is due to agents' promotion, we again rely on the difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variations generated by commission variables combined with the REBBA policy, both of which are well-motivated by the theory.

We find that about 64.3% of in-house transactions can be explained by buyers' own preference. In this case, agents' strategic promotion does not lead to a distortion in the home search process, because home buyers' *ex ante* preference for internal listings agrees with agents' interest. This is more likely to occur when agents work for a firm with a larger pool of listings, as larger firms tend to produce better internal matches. The remaining in-house transactions are likely due to agents' strategic promotion. For these transactions, we find that an agent's promotion of internal listings imposes a substantial cost when a buyer searches for external listings. In this case, even if a buyer's interest is best matched by

an external listing, she ends up purchasing a house from internal listings because expected utility gain from purchasing externally is not sufficient to outweigh the associated cost imposed by the agent's promotion. Lastly, we find that the REBBA has helped homebuyers make more informed choices and constrained agents' ability to strategically promote.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 provides background information about the residential real estate brokerage industry, and presents a simple agent-intermediated search model that motivates our empirical strategy. Section 4 describes our data and Section 5 provides reduced-form evidence for strategic promotion. Section 6 further develops our structural model and presents the results to quantify the extent of strategic promotion and its associated welfare loss. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2 Related Literature

Broadly speaking, our paper is informed by an important literature on the distortion of agents' incentives (e.g., Gruber and Owings, 1996; Mehran and Stulz, 1997; Hubbard, 1998; Garmaise and Moskowitz, 2004). In light of the central role of housing markets in the recent economy, there has been substantial interest in examining incentive issues in different sectors in housing markets. One such sector is the mortgage industry. For example, Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlačil (2014) find that loans issued by mortgage brokers have higher delinquency rates, reflecting incentive structures that compensate brokers mainly based on origination volume rather than loan performance.

Another sector that plays a crucial role in housing markets is the brokerage industry. An extensive and growing literature has examined the consequence of the misalignment between goals of real estate agents and those of home sellers. For example, recent work has examined the effects on selling price and time on the market of agent-owned versus client-owned properties (Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas, 2005; Levitt and Syverson, 2008a), MLS-listed versus FSBO properties (Hendel, Nevo, and Ortalo-Magne, 2009), and properties sold by traditional agents versus discounted agents (Levitt and

Syverson, 2008b; Berheim and Meer, 2008). One common thread between these papers is that the current commission arrangements have resulted in a distortion of agents' incentives, which in turn affects how much a house is sold for and how long it takes to sell.

Despite a significant interest in real estate agents' incentive issues, their importance in the specific context of in-house transactions has not been extensively studied. This seems surprising given the sheer magnitude of in-house transactions and obvious incentive issues that could arise from the dual agency representation. Gardiner, Heisler, Kallberg, and Liu (2007) are among the first to study the impact of dual agency in residential housing markets. They find that dual agency reduced the sales price and the time on the market and that both effects were weaker after a law change in Hawaii in 1984 which required full disclosure of dual agency. Using repeated sales properties, Evans and Kolbe (2005) examine the effect of dual agency on home price appreciation. In addition, Kadiyali, Prince, and Simon (2012) study the impact of dual agency on sales and listing price, as well as time on the market. However, like the previous literature on the real estate brokerage, these studies focus on transaction outcomes for home sellers. None of the existing work examines the consequences of agents' incentives on the quality of home match, which is the key transaction outcome for home buyers. The lack of such work is in large part due to the difficulty of determining the quality of a match between a buyer and a house.

In this paper, we marry the insights from the incentive distortion literature to the methodologies developed in the recent structural industrial organization literature (e.g., Bajari and Benkard, 2005; Bajari and Kahn, 2005). Specifically, we develop a structural model of in-house transactions and propose an approach to recover the idiosyncratic match value in home transaction process.¹ By linking our empirical work to an agent-intermediated search theory, we are also able to distinguish between different sources of in-house transactions – ranging from strategic promotion to efficient

¹To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study has attempted to solve the difficult problem of determining the quality of a match between a buyer and a house. We certainly do not claim that our approach presents a complete solution. Instead, our goal is to propose a tractable approach based on existing empirical frameworks, in hopes that the future research can build upon our approach to develop better solutions to the problem.

matching. Doing so allows us to evaluate the economic harm that the incentive misalignment brings to homebuyers. Such evaluation contributes to a better understanding of market efficiency in this important industry. In this regard, our work also complements the recent literature that examines social inefficiencies resulted from free entry in the real estate brokerage industry (Hsieh and Moretti, 2003; Han and Hong, 2011; Jia Barwick and Pathak, 2014).

3 In-House Transactions in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry

3.1 In-House Transactions

In a world where cooperating agents' interests are fully aligned with home buyers' interests, there should be no efficiency loss associated with in-house transactions since all transactions represent the best matching outcome for buyers. On the other hand, if agents have strategic interest to promote internal listings, buyers' benefits would be inevitably sacrificed, and a suboptimal match would be generated. Two characteristics of the residential real estate brokerage industry make the possible incentive issues particularly concerning for in-house transactions.

First, the agency relationship in real estate transactions does not encourage cooperating agents to represent the best interests of their buyers. In a typical multiple listing agreement for a real estate transaction, the listing agent has a contractual relationship with the seller, which explicitly defines his fiduciary obligations to the seller. The usual MLS agreement constitutes an offer of sub-agency to all other MLS members. The cooperating agent who brings the buyer to close the deal is deemed to have accepted the sub-agency offers and hence has fiduciary duties to the seller. Those duties effectively preclude the cooperating agent from adequately representing the buyer, even though the agent appears to work for the buyer.² While the conflicting loyalty by cooperating agents for buyers may seem obvious, many unsophisticated buyers are not aware of the agency relationship and rely heavily on their agents in searching for a home and negotiating the price of a home. The incentive misalignment problem is likely to worsen in in-house transactions, since agents from the same agency

²See Olazabal (2003) for detailed discussion on the agency relationship.

are more likely to share the information with each other and influence their clients' decisions from both ends.

Second, both academic researchers and market practitioners have noted that brokerage firms tend to offer a promotion bonus to agents who successfully sell in-house listings.³ There are at least two motivations for such promotions. First, in-house transactions help the firm clear inventory faster, allowing agents to earn commissions from existing clients sooner and hence have more time/resources to compete for new clients. Second, by promoting in-house sales, brokerage can potentially influence clients' decision from both sides, making a transaction easier to go through and hence maximizing the chance of capturing commission income from both ends.⁴ Consistent with this, a descriptive analysis of our data shows that brokerage firms with a higher fraction of in-house sales have a larger number of total transactions (separately counting each end of a transaction), even after controlling for the number of agents in each firm.

For these reasons, cooperating agents may strategically promote in-house transactions. For example, a cooperating agent may show her client internal listings before external listings.⁵ Alternatively, a cooperating agent may take her client to visit externally listed houses before visiting the internally listed house, but these external listings would be selected to appear less attractive than the internal listings that the agent tries to promote. These efforts are strategic and may lead to an in-house transaction that is inconsistent with the interest of home buyers.

Of course, an in-house transaction could also occur due to spontaneous visits or information sharing. For example, a buyer may see a for-sale sign on a property and call the listing agent whose name is

³ For example, Gardiner, Heisler, Kallberg and Liu (2007) find that many brokerage firms give a financial reward to agents who successfully match internal clients with internal listings. Similarly, a popular industry practice book, *Buying a Home: The Missing Manual*, reports that some agencies pay agents a bonus for selling in-house listings because the agency makes more money in such transactions. In addition, a recent report by the *Consumer Advocates in American Real Estate* explicitly points out that agents who avoid in-house transactions may bear with some financial consequences, such as a less favorable commission split with the brokerage firm.

⁴To see this, note that signing a contract with a client does not provide a guarantee for an agent to receive any commission as the transaction may not occur during the agent's contract term. This is particularly a concern for cooperating agents as they tend to have less exclusive and shorter contracts (or even no contract) with buyers.

⁵Similarly, a listing agent may show his client's house to internal buyers before external buyers. In this paper, we focus our discussion on cooperating agents, but the logic can be easily extended to listing agents.

listed on the sign. Similarly, an agency may become a dual agency if a buyer who is represented by a cooperating agent independently discovers a house where the listing agent works for the same agency as the buyer’s agent. It is not obvious whether these types of transactions would generate an efficient matching outcome or a suboptimal choice for consumers. However, their existence makes detecting strategic promotion empirically challenging. In this paper, we do not attempt to classify whether any particular in-house transaction occurs for strategic reasons; instead we exploit key differences in agents’ financial incentives and in consumers’ awareness of the agency relationship. In particular, we examine differences in the distribution of in-house transactions for agents with different financial incentives before and after a legislation that requires agents to disclose their agency relationship.

3.2 A Model of Agent-Intermediated Search

3.2.1 The Setup

Our motivating theoretical framework follows closely Hagiu and Jullien (2011), who provide an inspiring economics analysis of search diversion in an online shopping setting. We apply their search diversion theory to the real estate brokerage industry and show that agents can misguide homebuyers by introducing noise in the home search process. Unlike their model that assumes an intermediary receives a fixed amount of revenues from each store visit by buyers regardless of actual sales, we make a different assumption to reflect the key compensation feature of the real estate brokerage industry. That is, agents receive a fixed percentage of *realized* sales revenues and this percentage is *larger* when a transaction occurs within the same brokerage firm. As shown later, such compensation feature is the driving source of agents’ strategic promotion.

To simplify the analysis of the search process in the housing market, let us consider a setup where there are two types of buyers (buyer 1 and buyer 2), two types of houses (house 1 and house 2), and one cooperating agent.

Buyers: Buyers differ along two dimensions: preferences for houses and search costs. Along the first dimension, there are two types of buyers: type 1 buyers make up a fraction α of the population

and derive net utilities u^H from visiting house 1 and u^L from visiting house 2; type 2 buyers make up a fraction $1 - \alpha$ of the population and derive net utilities u^H from visiting house 2 and u^L from visiting house 1. We assume that $u^H > u^L$, which implies that *ex ante* type 1 buyers prefer house 1 over house 2, and that type 2 buyers prefer house 2 over house 1 in the sense that will be described below. Along the second dimension, buyers are differentiated by the search cost c they incur each time they visit a house. We use $F(c)$ to denote the cumulative distribution of c . They can only visit at most two houses sequentially.

More specifically, take buyer 1 as an example. Her valuation of a specific house h , v_h^1 , is unknown prior to the visit but is learnt upon inspection of the house, so that the expected utility prior to visiting the house is $u_h^1 = \int_{p_h}^k (v_h^1 - p_h) dG(v_h^1)$, where $G(v)$ denote the cumulative distribution of v ,⁶ $k = H$ if $h = 1$ and $k = L$ if $h = 2$. Assuming that $0 < L < H$, it follows that $u_1^1 > u_2^1$, and that $u^H = u_1^1$ and $u^L = u_2^1$. In other words, *ex ante* house 1 is a better match for buyer 1 than house 2. Note that u_h^1 should be interpreted as encompassing the utility of just “looking around” the house plus the expected utility of actually buying the house, net of the price paid. Upon visiting a house, a buyer observes the realized value of being matched with a specific house, v_h^1 , and then decides to whether to buy the house.

Houses: Houses also differ along two dimensions: matching quality and the listing brokerage firm. Along the first dimension, as described above, type 1 house stands for houses that *ex ante* match the buyer 1’s preference best, whereas house 2 stands for houses that *ex ante* match the buyer 2’s preference best. Along the second dimension, house 1 is listed by a firm that is different from the cooperating brokerage firm, whereas house 2 is listed by an agent affiliated with the same brokerage firm.

For simplicity, we assume that prices of houses are exogenously given at p_1 and p_2 . This is because house prices are typically determined by general market conditions, which is much broader than the

⁶For any given buyer, v_1^1 and v_2^1 are assumed to be independently distributed.

choice of intermediaries. In addition, the listing price of a house is publicly advertised before the cooperating agents and their buyers are engaged in the search process. To the extent that the sales and listing prices are highly positively correlated, the exogeneity assumption is justified.

Cooperating Agent: The cooperating agent observes each buyer’s type (1 or 2) but not her search cost c . Since the agent is assumed to have superior information about houses available in the market, he immediately knows which house *ex ante* fits the buyer’s preference best. Following Hagiu and Jullien (2011), we denote by q_1 the probability that the agent takes buyer 1 to house 1 for the *first* visit. If the cooperating agent always optimize the match process between buyers and houses, then we should expect $q_1 = 1$. In contrast, we say that the cooperating agent “strategically” promotes his own firm’s listings (i.e., house 2) whenever $q_1 < 1$.

The cooperating agent receives a fixed percentage of actual sales price as commission income when a transaction is completed. This income is then split with the agent’s affiliated brokerage firm. In net, the cooperating agent obtains a fixed share of transaction price, τ_1 (or τ_2), from the sale of house 1 (or house 2). If an agent receives a bonus for promoting internal listings, then all else equal, $\tau_2 > \tau_1$. As a result, the cooperating agent for buyer 1 may sometimes find it profitable to recommend house 2 which generates the highest revenue, rather than house 1 which matches buyer 1’s preference best. The incidence of $q_1 < 1$ captures precisely the inefficiency resulted from the commission structure described above.

Timing: The timing of decisions is as follows: (i) the agent publicly announces q_1 ; (ii) buyers observe q_1 ; (iii) buyers decide whether to follow agent’s guidance, engage in the search process, and make their purchase decisions after visiting the house(s).

3.2.2 Solving the Model

Without loss of generality, let us focus our analysis on type 1 buyers. First, consider a type 1 buyer with high search costs, i.e., $c > u^H(p_1)$. In this case, the buyer would not visit any of the two houses, and as a result, the agent receives zero commission income.

Next, consider a type 1 buyer with low search costs, i.e., $c \leq u^L(p_2)$. She will visit both houses irrespective of where the agent directs her for her first visit. Upon visiting both houses, the buyer compares two houses and purchases the one that gives her the largest net realized utility, $\max\{v_1 - p_1, v_2 - p_2\}$. Accordingly, the probability of buyer 1 purchasing house 2, ρ_2^1 , is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho_2^1 &\equiv \Pr(v_2^1 - p_2 > v_1^1 - p_1) \\
&= \int_{p_1}^H \int_{v_1^1 - p_1 + p_2}^L dG_L(v_2^1) dG_H(v_1^1) \\
&= \int_{p_1}^H (1 - G_L(v_1^1 - p_1 + p_2)) dG_H(v_1^1) \tag{1}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus the cooperating agent receives commission income $\tau_2 p_2$ with probability ρ_2^1 and $\tau_1 p_1$ with probability $1 - \rho_2^1$.

Finally, consider a type 1 buyer with intermediate search costs, i.e., $u^L(p_2) \leq c \leq u^H(p_1)$. In this case, if the buyer is first sent to house 1 (which happens with probability q_1), she would make a purchase and stop visiting another house if the net realized value from buying house 1, $(v_1 - p_1)$, is greater than the expected utility of continuing visiting house 2, $\max\{u^L(p_2) - c, 0\}$. Since $u^L(p_2) \leq c$, $\max\{u^L(p_2) - c, 0\} = 0$, so that she will not visit house 2 with probability 1. If she is first sent to house 2 (which happens with probability $1 - q_1$), she would stop searching if and only if the net realized utility, $(v_2 - p_2)$, is greater than the expected utility of continuing visiting house 1, that is, $\max\{u^H(p_1) - c, 0\} = u^H(p_1) - c$. In the event when buyer 1 visits both houses, she will purchase house 1 with probability $1 - \rho_2^1$ and house 2 with probability ρ_2^1 .

Knowing the probability q_1 , a type 1 buyer follows the agent's guidance if her search cost is above $u^L(p_2)$ and below some critical value u_1 , where $u_1 = c$ is implicitly defined by

$$q_1 u^H(p_1) + (1 - q_1) \int \max(v_2 - p_2, u^H(p_1) - c) g_L(v_2) dv_2 - c = 0$$

Note that when $q_1 = 1$, we have $u_1 = u^H(p_1)$ and $\frac{du_1}{dq_1} = u^H(p_1) - u^L(p_2)$.

Turning to the agent's side, the revenue he derives from type 1 buyers is then:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pi_1 &= (\tau_1 p_1 (1 - \rho_2^1) + \tau_2 p_2 \rho_2^1) F(u_L) + q_1 \tau_1 p_1 (F(u_1) - F(u_L)) \\
&\quad + (1 - q_1) \left[(\tau_1 p_1 (1 - \rho_2^1) + \tau_2 p_2 \rho_2^1) \int_{u^L}^{u_1} G_L(p_2 + u^H - c) f(c) dc \right. \\
&\quad \left. + \tau_2 p_2 \int_{u^L}^{u_1} (1 - G_L(p_2 + u^H - c)) f(c) dc \right] \tag{2}
\end{aligned}$$

The first term represents the revenue that the agent receives from type 1 with low search costs, i.e., with $c \leq u^L(p_2)$. The second term represents the revenue that the agent receives from type 1 buyers who have intermediate search costs, i.e., with $u^L(p_2) \leq c \leq u_1$, and have been efficiently matched to house 1 on their first visit. The third term represents the revenue that the agent receives from type 1 buyers who have intermediate search costs but have been strategically directed to house 2 first. Note that the first integrant term is the probability that the buyer decides to continue searching conditional on having visited house 2 in the first round of search. In this case, the agent receives $\tau_1 p_1$ with probability $1 - \rho_2^1$ and $\tau_2 p_2$ with probability ρ_2^1 .

Maximizing (2) over q_1 yields the following proposition, which contains our baseline results:

Proposition 1 *The cooperating agent “strategically” promotes in-house transactions (i.e., $q_1 < 1$) if and only if*

$$\frac{\tau_2 p_2}{\tau_1 p_1} > \frac{F(u^H) - F(u^L) - (1 - \rho_2^1) \int_{u^L}^{u_1} G_L(p_2 + u^H - c) f(c) dc + f(u^H)(u^H - u^L)}{F(u^H) - F(u^L) - (1 - \rho_2^1) \int_{u^L}^{u_1} G_L(p_2 + u^H - c) f(c) dc} \tag{3}$$

Proof: The cooperating agent maximizes (2) over q_1 . Using the fact $u_1(q_1 = 1) = u^H(p_1)$ and $\frac{du_1}{dq_1}(q_1 = 1) = u^H(p_1) - u^L(p_2)$, it is straightforward to show that $\frac{\partial \Pi_1}{\partial q_1}(q_1 = 1) < 0$ if and only if (3) holds. ■

3.2.3 Strategic In-House Transactions

Condition (3) is central to understanding of agents' incentives to strategically promote in-house transactions. In particular, at $q_1 = 1$, all type 1 buyers with intermediate search costs will be first directed to houses that match their preference best, leading to an efficient matching outcome. By laying out

conditions under which the cooperating agent lowers q_1 below 1, condition (3) immediately delivers several predictions of strategic in-house transactions that can be taken to the data.

Prediction 1: The commission structure matters. It is clear from condition (3) that the optimal amount of strategic promotion increases with the ratio $\frac{\tau_2 P_2}{\tau_1 P_1}$. If the prices of two houses are not too different from each other (which is not too unreasonable given that buyers usually specify a price range for houses they search for), the larger is the ratio $\frac{\tau_2}{\tau_1}$, the more likely condition (3) will hold, and the stronger is the agent's incentive to promote her own firm's listings. In the brokerage industry, agents need to split commission fees with their affiliated brokerage offices, in return for the brand value and for the supporting services that brokerage offices provide. In practice, full commission brokerage firms, such as ReMax, let the agents keep all commission fees but require a fixed amount of upfront fees each month. More traditional brokerages firms, such as Royal LePage, split commission fees with their agents on the per-transaction basis. Naturally, the revenues in the latter type of brokerage firms strictly increase with the number of either end of transactions. Therefore, these brokerage firms are more likely to reward their agents for selling internal listings, making $\tau_2 > \tau_1$.⁷ Thus, we expect that the per-transaction split commission structure is associated with a stronger presence of strategic in-house transactions.

In addition to commission structure, commission rate also matters. Note that the commission rate for a cooperating agent is typically predetermined when the listing is posted on the MLS. While the commission rate is usually set at 2.5%, some listing agents would offer a higher or lower rate to cooperating agents. Intuitively, by rewarding cooperating agents a greater proportion of the commission, an external listing agent can effectively increase τ_1 in condition (3), and this helps offset the promotion bonus that the cooperating agent receives from her own firm for promoting internal listings. Conversely, when the commission rate offered by a listing agent is low, the cooperating agent is more likely to respond to the financial incentives offered by the brokerage firm for promoting in-house

⁷See the footnote 3 for discussion on the related industry practice.

transactions. The strategy of using substandard commission rates to artificially increase the frequency of dual-agency transactions is discussed in Yavas, *et al* (2013) and also evidenced by a recent industry report.⁸ Thus, we expect that lower commission rates offered by listing agents are associated with a stronger presence of strategic in-house transactions.

Prediction 2: The extent to which cooperating agents can promote in-house transactions depends on the difference in the matching quality that a given buyer obtains from internal and external listings. As we can see from condition (3), the bigger is $(u^H - u^L)$ and/or ρ_2^1 , the smaller is the likelihood of strategic promotion ($q_1 < 1$). Intuitively, if the best house that a buyer can find from external listings is far better than the one she can find from internal listings, either *ex ante* (reflected by $u^H - u^L$) or *ex post* (reflected by ρ_2^1), then it becomes difficult for her agent to promote internal listings. Empirically, we do not observe matching quality. However, matching in housing markets is typically characterized by increasing returns to scale (Ngai and Tereyro 2014; Genesove and Han 2012b). When a brokerage firm has a larger number of listings which a buyer can choose among, there should be less dispersion in the buyer’s valuation of her most-preferred house from the market-wide pool and from the internal listings. As a result, the brokerage firm will find it easier to promote its own listings. Although the promoted listings may not match the buyer’s preference best, the resulting efficiency loss should be smaller since these listings are closer to the buyer’s preference.

Prediction 3: The brokerage firm’s ability to strategically promote in-house transactions also depends on whether buyers are aware of agents’ incentives to strategically promote. So far, the model has assumed that buyers faced with a known probability of q_1 . If buyers are not aware of agents’ strategic incentives, this would remove the dependence of $\frac{du_1}{dq_1}$ in deriving the derivative of Π_1 with respect to q_1 . As a result, the right-hand-side of condition (3) is reduced to 1. In this case, the agent’s incentive to promote in-house transactions would purely depend on the financial reward ($\frac{T_2}{T_1}$) and search

⁸For example, a recent report by the *Consumer Advocates in American Real Estate* states that “offering less than the going rate in your area will decrease the financial attractiveness of your home [to cooperating agents] and increases the likelihood that your broker will collect a double commission” (see an article titled “Dual Agency Schemes” in <http://www.caare.org/ForBuyers>, accessed August 1, 2014).

cost. The quality difference would no longer matter, since buyers believe that agents always match them to their first best house and hence would not be sensitive to the difference between the first and second best houses ($u^H - u^L$). As discussed later, our sample covers a natural experimental opportunity permitted by a legislation that required real estate agents engaged in in-house transactions to disclose the possibility of strategic promotion to both buyers and sellers. This provides an opportunity for us to empirically test this prediction.

3.2.4 Efficient In-House Transactions

In-house transactions could also occur for efficiency rather than incentive reasons. We define an in-house transaction as “efficient” if the buyer’s net utility from internal listings is larger than her net utility from external listings, either *ex ante* or *ex post*. In our model, the probability of efficient in-house transactions is given by:

$$P = (\alpha\rho_2^1 + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \rho_1^2)) F(u_L) + (1 - \alpha)(F(u_2) - F(u_L)) \quad (4)$$

The first term in (4) refers to the probability of in-house transactions by type 1 and type 2 buyers with low search costs. With probability ρ_2^1 , a type 1 buyer purchases house 2 because house 2 delivers larger net realized utility than house 1. Similarly, with probability $1 - \rho_1^2$, a type 2 buyer purchases house 2. In both cases, transactions occur within the same brokerage firm, and these in-house transactions represent the outcome of buyers’ own choices rather than agents’ promotional efforts. In particular, the low search cost removes the reliance of buyers on agents in looking for ideal homes, resulting in an efficient match between buyers and houses, regardless of whether the transaction occurs within the same brokerage firm or not.

The second term in (4) refers to the probability of in-house transactions by type 2 buyers with intermediate search costs. It is straightforward to show that with probability $q_2 = 1$, all type 2 buyers will be first directed to house 2.⁹ Moreover, these buyers would end up purchasing house 2, since

⁹To see this, note that for type 2 buyers, a similar condition as condition (3) can be obtained by changing only the

the expected utility of visiting house 1 is less than the search cost. In this case, the agents' incentive to promote their own listings is consistent with the buyers' interest, because these listings match the buyers' *ex ante* preference best. This type of in-house transactions, although promoted by cooperating agents, represents an efficient matching outcome.

Thus, the model predicts two types of efficient in-house transactions. Under the first type, a buyer receives the largest *ex post* utility from an internal listing through her own comparison of all available listings. Under the second type, a buyer is directed by an agent to an internal listing that matches her *ex ante* preference best. Since the first type of in-house transactions are not driven by agents, we focus our discussion on the second type of in-house transactions, which is driven by mutual interests of buyers and their agents. Note that our model takes the buyer's choice of the cooperating brokerage as given (reflected by an exogenous α), hence we are unable to explicitly model the sources of efficient in-house transactions. In practice, buyers' *ex ante* preference for an internal listing may agree with the agent's self-promotion interest for various reasons. For example, an in-house transaction may lower transaction costs and improve the efficiency in the bargaining and closing stage, making buyers more likely to favor transactions within the same brokerage house. Alternatively, a buyer may choose a cooperating agent simply because the agent's affiliated firm specializes in listing houses that fit the buyer's interest best. In both cases, in-house transactions are caused by a mixture of transaction efficiencies and information advantages.

In sum, there are a number of brokerage- and transaction-specific features that can be tied to predictions about in-house transactions. These range from sources of strategic promotion to sources of efficient matching. In addition, a legislation that increases consumers' awareness of agents' incentives would affect in-house transactions under strategic promotion but not those under efficient matching.

Together, these predictions provide a basis for the difference-in-differences strategy used in our em-

left-hand side in (3) to $\frac{\tau_1 p_1}{\tau_2 p_2}$. Assuming that houses 1 and 2 are in the same price range, with the in-house promotion bonus, the left-hand side is less than 1, while the right-hand side is greater than 1. This implies that the threshold condition will never be met, and hence $q_2 = 1$.

pirical analysis. The model also implies that a full control of efficient matching can be obtained by comparing a buyer's expected utility from internal and external listings, which further motivates the structural approach that we exploit in Section 6.

4 Data

The main source of our data is the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) in a large North American metropolitan area from January 2001 to December 2009. Our sample covers 28 districts which comprise a third of the metropolitan area. There are over 200,000 transactions and about 1,500 brokerage firms. The MLS data contain detailed information on house characteristics, including the number of bedrooms, the number of washrooms, lot size, the primary room size, dummy variables for basement, garage space and occupancy. In addition, the data provide neighborhood information, listing and transaction prices, as well as real estate brokerage firms on both sides of a transaction. Properties are identified in the MLS data by district, MLS number, address, unit number (if applicable). To avoid some extreme cases, we exclude the following transactions from the estimation sample: (1) transactions for which the sales price is less than \$30,000 or more than \$3,000,000; (2) transactions for which the cooperating commissions are less than 0.5% or more than 5%; (3) listings that stay on the market for less than one day or more than one year.¹⁰

We define in-house transactions as transactions for which the cooperating agent and the listing agent are associated with the same brokerage office. In our sample, about 20% of transactions occur within the same brokerage office. Tables 1-2 report the fraction of in-house transactions by brokerage office size. In Table 1, we rank cooperating brokerages in order of their total market shares in our data, and group them by their rankings. In Table 2, we group cooperating brokerages by the number of real estate agents. Both tables show that larger brokerages tend to have relatively higher fractions of in-house transactions, as what one would expect.

¹⁰We also estimated our model using somewhat different cutoffs (e.g. the cooperating commission rates are less than 1%; listings stay on the market for fewer than 2 days), our results are robust to these changes.

One might wonder whether these in-house transactions can simply be a result of independent hiring decisions made separately by buyers and sellers. In that case, conditional on a given buyer working with brokerage j , the probability that the buyer purchases a house listed by the same brokerage should be equal to the market share of listing brokerage j . In other words,

$$\Pr(\text{listing} = j | \text{cooperating} = j) = \Pr(\text{listing} = j). \quad (5)$$

However, as shown in Figure 1, brokerage-office-level fractions of in-house transactions at any given district of the sample city are much higher than the dashed line which depicts the fractions predicted from (5). This suggests that a significant fraction of in-house transactions cannot be explained by independent interactions among brokerage firm, hence providing a key motivation for the empirical analysis in this paper.

As noted earlier, a legislation named the REBBA was implemented in the sample city in March 2006, and it requires brokerages and agents involved in in-house sales to inform buyers and sellers of the nature of their relationship in writing before a transaction is conducted. The agents need to disclose not only the fact that the listing and cooperating agents work for the same office but also the fact that the cooperating agent is a sub-agent of the listing agent and hence has fiduciary duties to the seller.¹¹ By making clients more aware of the agency relationship and the possible incentive issues, the REBBA is most likely to affect the incidence of in-house transactions that occur for strategic reasons while leaving other types of in-house transactions unaffected. Table 3 shows a slight downward trend for in-house transactions in our sample, with a discrete drop after 2006, consistent with what we expected. The downward trend further continued in the years after 2006. This is not surprising, as we expect that it takes time for the policy to be fully enforced and for consumers to fully understand the incentive issues behind dual agency.

¹¹The anecdotal evidence suggests that agents sometimes need to disclose the financial rewards they received from the brokerage firm for promoting in-house sales.

5 Testing Strategic Promotions: A Reduced-Form Approach

5.1 Testing the Effects of Commission Incentives

To test the presence of strategic promotion, we estimate the following linear probability model

$$E(d_{ibt}|Z_{it}, X_{it}, W_{bt}, \eta_{ibt}) = Z_{it}\alpha + X_{it}\beta + W_{bt}\delta + \eta_{ibt}, \quad (6)$$

where d_{ibt} is the indicator variable for whether transaction i at period t is an in-house transaction carried out by brokerage b , and Z_{it} is a vector of firm- and transaction-specific variables related to commission structure/rate in transaction i . Specifically, $Z_{it} = (COMM_{it}, COMM_{it} \times REBBA_{it})$, where $COMM_{it}$ is defined below, and $REBBA_{it}$ is a dummy variable for the REBBA. X_{it} refers to a vector of control variables including house lot size, number of bedrooms, number of washrooms, dummy variables for the basement, garage space, and occupancy status. W_{ib} refer to brokerage-level variables such as the number of internal listings by brokerage b in the same district during the month before the transaction.¹² In addition, η_{ibt} denotes various fixed effects for location, time, brokerage, and house.

The key variable of interest is $COMM_{it}$, which captures agents' commission incentives to promote in-house transactions. As described in Section 3.2.3, this is measured by two commission variables. The first is `split`, a firm-specific dummy variable that equals 1 if the cooperating agent splits commission fees with the brokerage firm on the per-transaction basis. The second is `low.commission`, a transaction-specific dummy variable that equals 1 if the commission fees received by the cooperating agent from the listing agent in a given transaction are lower than 2.5% of the house price. Note that the commission fees are determined at the beginning of the listing process and remain the same until a transaction is completed. As discussed earlier, agents who split commission fees with firms on the per-transaction basis are more likely to receive a promotion bonus; and a lower commission rate offered by the listing agents from other brokerages would make the in-house promotion bonus effectively more attractive

¹²If in-house sales transactions help enhance search efficiency, liquidity theory suggests that such benefits are bigger for firms with a larger number of listings. This effect would be captured by a positive δ in (6).

to the cooperating agent. Following Prediction 1 in Section 3.2.3, we hypothesize that agents with stronger commission incentives are more likely to engage in in-house transactions, thus we would expect the coefficients on `split`, `low.commission`, and `split×low.commission` to be positive .

Though commission structures and fees are predetermined, we cannot infer strategic promotion directly from a straightforward comparison of transactions with different commission structures/fees, since brokerage firms may intentionally set their commission policies in an attempt to capture transaction cost savings resulted from in-house sales. Some of these savings may be passed onto the buyers and sellers, improving transaction efficiencies in general. If this is the case, then the higher probability of in-house transactions associated with the per-transaction split structure and/or lower commission fees cannot be interpreted as evidence for “strategic” promotion.

Hence, we take a difference-in-differences approach by including a term $COMM_{it} \times REBBA_{it}$. Specifically, we examine differences in the incidence of in-house transactions for agents with different commission structure/rates before and after the REBBA. Following Prediction 3 in section 3.2.3, we hypothesize that agents’ ability to strategically promote will be weakened after buyers are more aware of agents’ financial incentives. Thus, our empirical exercise is a joint test of the hypotheses that promotion of internal listings takes place under certain commission incentives and that the ability to promote is weakened after the REBBA. In other words, the identification in our model does not require the assumption that commission variables are exogenous; instead it relies on the assumption that no other commission related factors differentially affect the incidence of in-house transactions at the same time as the REBBA was implemented.

There are a number of legitimate concerns with our approach. Perhaps, one important concern is that we do not observe the actual promotion bonus directly but must infer it. Given the lack of information on the brokerage internal compensation scheme, this issue is of course inherent in doing research in this area. As argued above, we draw such inference based on two commission variables, both of which are motivated by the industry practice. In what follows, we will further deal with this issue

by estimating a rich set of specifications to build a strong case that the commission effects we examine are due to strategic promotion and not due to other unobserved factors. Another important concern is related to the identifying assumption described above. In particular, commission structures/rates may have changed after REBBA either because the brokerage firm characteristics has shifted over time or because the pool of houses that attract low commission rates have changed in a way that is not observed from the data. We discuss this concern at length in the robustness section below. Here, we note that this is addressed by controlling for a rich set of fixed effects, including the interaction of brokerage fixed effects with the REBBA dummy and the interaction of house fixed effects with the REBBA dummy. The results show that changes in unobserved firm/house characteristics, contemporaneous with the REBBA, are unlikely to alter the interpretation of our key findings.

5.2 Baseline Results

In the baseline estimation, six different versions are estimated, and the results are reported in Table 4. We begin with the simplest specification where $COMM_{it}$ is measured by a single commission variable, `split`. The related coefficient estimates in column 1 are statistically significant and consistent with what we expected. In particular, splitting commission fees with the firm on the per-transaction basis increases the probability of in-house transactions by 1.3%, while such effect disappears substantially after the implementation of the REBBA.

Despite our rich control of housing attributes, one might be concerned that unobserved house quality could vary so much to render the estimates imprecise. One plausible control variable for unobserved house quality is the listing price, because the listing price is likely to reflect not only observed but also unobserved house quality. Column 2 adds the listing price to the baseline specification. The coefficients on the `split` variables remain almost the same, both in magnitude and in significance.

In column 3, we turn to a different commission variable – `low.commission`. The coefficient estimates are also consistent with what we expected. In particular, receiving lower than 2.5% commission fees from the listing agent increases the probability of in-house transactions by 5%. Such effect is reduced

to 3.6% after the implementation of the REBBA. The results are robust to the inclusion of the listing price, as shown in column 4.

In columns 5-6, we include both measures of commission incentives. Listing prices are controlled in column 6, but not in column 5. As before, splitting commission fees and receiving a lower commission fee increase the probability of in-house transactions. Moreover, the incentive effect is particularly strong when both commission variables are in effect. For example, splitting commission fees alone increases the probability of in-house transactions by 1.0%; this effect is further increased to 4.1% for agents receiving lower commission fees. The finding is consistent with our hypothesis that a lower commission payment makes the promotion bonus offered by the brokerage firm more attractive to the cooperating agent, and hence gives the latter stronger incentives to sell in-house listings. More importantly, these incentive effects largely disappear after the implementation of the REBBA, as reflected by the negative coefficients on the REBBA interaction terms. The strong positive coefficients associated with the commission variables, and particularly their interactions, suggest that financial incentives at least partially explain in-house transactions, as predicted by the theory. The substantial weakening impact of the REBBA on the commission effects further suggests that the variations in in-house transactions caused by commission changes are an indicator of agents' strategic behavior rather than transaction efficiencies. In what follows, we will treat columns 5-6 as primary specifications for more robustness checks.

5.3 Robustness Checks

The baseline specification results point to a strong presence of strategic promotions in explaining in-house transactions. However, one might be concerned that the estimated strategic effects could be due to a set of unobserved factors either at the house level or at the brokerage level that are correlated with commission policies. If this is the case, then we would not be able to convincingly interpret our finding as the evidence for strategic promotion. In this section, we provide a set of robustness checks to address this concern.

Table 5 presents a set of robustness checks that deal with time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Listing prices are controlled in the bottom panel (columns 6-10), but not in the top panel (columns 1-5). For the ease of comparison, columns 1 and 6 (in both Table 5-6) respectively repeat the results presented in columns 5-6 in Table 4. As a further control for unobserved house attributes, we restrict the sample to houses that were sold multiple times in our sample period.¹³ Doing so allows us to control for house fixed effects at the cost of dropping two thirds of observations. Columns 2 and 7 of Table 5 present the results. The estimates on commission and REBBA variables are qualitatively consistent with columns 1 and 6, although some of them are less precise than before, probably due to the substantially reduced sample size.

In columns 3 and 8, we return to the full sample but control for the idiosyncratic brokerage fixed effects. If in-house transactions are more likely to occur for certain brokerage firms due to their specific policies or network size, its effect on our estimates should be controlled by including brokerage firm fixed effects. However, the key coefficient estimates on commission and REBBA variables continue to be strong and significant and have expected signs, suggesting that unobserved brokerage factors are unlikely to change the interpretation of our findings.

As our theoretical model implies, in-house transactions could occur for efficiency rather than incentive reasons. For example, when a brokerage has superior information about properties and buyers' demand curve in a specific housing market segment, an in-house transaction can lead to a better and quicker matching outcome. In the remaining columns, we control for brokerage specialization by adding the interactions of brokerage firm dummies with neighborhoods (columns 4 and 9) and with price ranges (columns 5 and 10). The former are intended to control for specialization based on geographical areas, while the latter for specialization based on certain price ranges. In both specifications, we find that the effects of commission variables continue to be positive and significant, particularly so for agents who split commissions with the firm. Moreover, these effects are much

¹³We drop houses that were sold multiple times within six months, because they are likely due to "flipping".

weakened after the REBBA. Together, these estimates suggest that our findings about the strategic promotion are quite robust.

So far we have shown that time-invariant unobserved house attributes or brokerage factors are unlikely to alter the interpretation of our key results. However, this does not rule out the possibility that there might be important differences in unobserved house or firm characteristics before and after the REBBA that are correlated with commission variables. If this is the case, the interpretation of our difference-in-differences estimates would still be questionable. In Table 6, we address this concern by explicitly controlling for time-varying unobserved heterogeneity particularly before and after the implementation of the REBBA.

Along this line, one possible story is that some properties might be easier to sell because of some unobserved attractive characteristics, and that these properties might be sold internally and carry lower commissions. If the fraction of such properties changed after the REBBA, then the finding of the weakened impact of commission effects could be due to the shift in the distribution of unobserved property characteristics, rather than the change in agents' strategic promotion. To address this concern, we restrict the sample to the repeated sales and include house fixed effects interacted with the REBBA dummy. As shown in columns 2 and 7 of Table 6, the commission variables continue to have a significant and positive effect, and their interaction with REBBA continues to have a significant and negative effect. The consistent and strong difference-in-differences estimates suggest that our finding of strategic promotion is unlikely to be attributed to changes in unobserved house characteristics after the implementation of the REBBA.

Similarly, one may argue that there might be differences in brokerage characteristics before and after the REBBA, which could affect both commission policies and frequency of in-house transactions. For example, the pool of brokers offering lower commission fees might have shifted after the REBBA for non-strategic reasons. Alternatively, full-commission and split-commission brokerage firms could have experienced different trends before and after the REBBA. While we cannot completely rule out

this possibility, we find no evidence that such possibility would affect our key result. In particular, we return to the full sample and include brokerage fixed effects interacted with the REBBA dummy. As shown in columns 3 and 8 of Table 6, the key coefficient estimates on commission and REBBA variables are again consistent with what we expected, both in sign and in significance.

One could further postulate that the fraction of in-house transactions induced by brokerage specialization might have also changed after the implementation of the REBBA, which would affect the interpretation of our key estimates. To address this concern, we additionally include a triple interaction term $brokerage \times region \times REBBA$ (in columns 4 and 9) and another triple interaction term $brokerage \times price\ range \times REBBA$ (in columns 5 and 10) to control for the time variation in the fraction of in-house transactions due to different types of brokerage specialization. The resulting estimates are again consistent with what we have expected, confirming that time variation in brokerage specialization is unlikely to change the interpretation of our key findings.

6 Quantifying Strategic Promotions: A Structural Approach

So far we have obtained a set of findings that are consistent with the key predictions of our theoretical model. While these results are strongly supportive of the presence for the strategic promotions, they cannot tell us the extent of the strategic promotion in explaining in-house transactions. In addition, they cannot help us evaluate the welfare impact of strategic promotion and the associated disclosure requirement. The challenge to conducting such exercise in a reduced-form way is that matching efficiencies are generally unobserved and hard to quantify. For this reason, we develop a structural model that attempts to quantify the extent of strategic promotion with an explicit control of efficient matching, and to further evaluate the welfare implications of the agency disclosure requirement. We begin by describing our structural model in subsection 6.1, and then present the estimation results in subsection 6.2.

6.1 Structural Model

The key idea of our structural approach is as follows: for a given buyer, her decision on whether purchasing an internal listing reflects the difference between the net utility that she obtains from internal versus external listings and the net cost that she incurs when searching for internal versus external listings. If her cooperating agent strategically promote internal listings, such promotion would artificially increase the buyer’s cost of searching for external listings. Thus, to the extent that the idiosyncratic matching values for internal and external listings can be estimated, we can recover the implicit costs that the agent may impose on the buyer for searching external listings.

To implement this idea, we develop our model in three steps. In the first step, we build on and modify the hedonic framework developed by Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005), which allows us to locally recover buyer-specific preferences for house characteristics.¹⁴ Next, using the recovered preference, we construct idiosyncratic match values that a buyer obtains from internal and external listings. In the third step, using the observed decisions on in-house transactions and the recovered match values, we estimate the implicit costs associated with strategic promotion. To identify part of the cost due to agents’ promotion, we again rely on the difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variations generated by commission variables combined with the REBBA policy. In what follows, we begin with the modified version of the hedonic framework, and then describe the second and third steps. The estimation details are provided in Appendix.

6.1.1 Modified Hedonic Framework

To describe the model, let us consider market $t \in T$, where there are $i = 1, \dots, I_t$ home buyers who are looking for houses, and $j = 1, \dots, J_t$ housing units that sellers put on the market. The interactions of

¹⁴Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005) improve upon the hedonic two-step approach of Rosen (1974) and Epple (1987) by incorporating a nonparametric estimation for the hedonic price function and by proposing an approach to recover the unobserved product characteristic. Note that their framework is not originally intended for constructing counterfactual match values for internal listings versus external listings, nor recovering implicit costs associated with strategic promotion. Therefore, we modify the hedonic framework in order to incorporate strategic promotion and rationalize our approach to construct counterfactual match values.

a large number of buyers and sellers will lead to hedonic equilibrium in which buyers match to houses, and the resulting equilibrium prices are determined by the hedonic price function that maps housing characteristics to prices as follows: $p_j = \mathbf{p}_t(X_j, \xi_j)$, where p_j is the sales price of house j , X_j is a $1 \times m$ vector of observed attributes of house j , ξ_j is the unobserved house characteristic, and \mathbf{p}_t is the price function in market t that varies across markets, reflecting different equilibria. In our application, we consider the price function given by

$$\log(\mathbf{p}_t(X_j, \xi_j)) = \alpha_{j,0} + \sum_{k=1}^m \alpha_{j,k} x_{j,k} + \eta_t + \xi_j,$$

where $\alpha_j = (\alpha_{j,0}, \dots, \alpha_{j,m})$ is a vector of the hedonic coefficients that represent the implicit prices faced by each buyer who has chosen house j , and η_t captures market fixed effects.¹⁵

Because our goal is to recover a buyer's preferences, we focus on the buyer's problem. We posit that buyers' utility functions are defined over house characteristics X_j and ξ_j , as well as the composite commodity denoted by e . The buyer's problem is to maximize her utility $u_i(X_j, \xi_j, e)$ subject to the budget constraint. Following Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005), we impose a functional form assumption for identification of the utility function. In particular, we assume the linear utility function¹⁶ given by

$$u_i(X_j, \xi_j, e) = \sum_{k=1}^m \beta_{i,k} x_{j,k} + \beta_{i,0} \xi_j + e \quad (7)$$

where $\beta_i = (\beta_{i,0}, \dots, \beta_{i,m})$ is a vector of buyer-specific random coefficients capturing buyer i 's preferences for housing characteristics.

To allow for a decision that leads to an in-house transaction, we modify the standard hedonic framework by assuming that the buyer's decisions are determined in two stages: in the first stage, the buyer chooses X_j and ξ_j ; in the second stage, the buyer decides on d_j , where d_j is the indicator

¹⁵This price function is a linear approximation of $\mathbf{p}_t(X_j, \xi_j)$ in a local neighborhood of house j 's characteristics. Hence, α_j varies across different houses, and so they are estimated nonparametrically by using the approach described in Appendix. In this price function, η_t includes district fixed effects as well as year \times month fixed effects. Note also that different markets (based on either location or time) lead to different equilibria, so that houses with the same characteristics can have different prices if they are in different markets.

¹⁶We experimented with other functional forms such as log-linear utility, but find that our results are still robust.

variable for whether house j is listed by the same brokerage as the buyer's cooperating brokerage. To incorporate the second stage while maintaining the hedonic framework, we specifically use two modifications as follows.

First, we assume that the budget constraint is given by

$$e + p_j + g_i(d_j) = y_i,$$

where the price of the composite commodity is normalized to one, y_i is buyer i 's income, and $g_i(d_j)$ is assumed to reflect the implicit costs and benefits associated with d_j . In particular, we assume that $g_i(d_j) = c_i(1 - d_j) - \gamma_i d_j$, where c_i is a random coefficient representing extra search costs for external listings if buyer i 's agent strategically promotes internal listings; while γ_i is a random coefficient capturing potential transaction cost savings if buyer i purchases a house from internal listings. Intuitively, strategic promotion occurs when the agent introduces noise into the search process by making it more costly for the buyer to shop for external listings,¹⁷ which is captured by c_i . On the other hand, an in-house transaction could generate transaction efficiencies that implicitly benefit buyer i .¹⁸ While these benefits do not affect the idiosyncratic match value, they still affect buyer i 's decision by generating transaction cost savings. We capture these benefits by γ_i .

Second, we assume that the first stage is determined separately from the second stage. Note that after substituting the budget constraint into $u_i(X_j, \xi_j, e)$, we can write the buyer's problem as

$$\max_{(X_j, \xi_j), d_j} u_i(X_j, \xi_j, y_i - \mathbf{p}_t(X_j, \xi_j) - g_i(d_j)).$$

Our assumption implies that despite the presence of d_j , the buyer's choice with respect to X_j and ξ_j is still optimal, in that the following first-order conditions hold and they do not depend on d_j .

$$\beta_{i,k} = \frac{\partial \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial x_{j,k}}, \text{ and } \beta_{i,0} = \frac{\partial \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial \xi_j}, \quad (8)$$

¹⁷For instance, a cooperating agent may show her client internal listings before external listings. Alternatively, the agent may take her client to visit externally listed houses before visiting the internally listed house, but these external listings would be selected to appear less attractive than the internal listings that the agent tries to promote.

¹⁸For example, it may reduce the time that buyer i spends on searching and negotiating process. In addition, agents involved in in-house transactions may be willing to provide a free inspection or commission rebates.

where j^* denotes house j chosen by buyer i . Therefore, if we recover the slope of the price function locally, then we can also locally recover buyer i 's random coefficient β_i , that is, buyer-specific preferences for house characteristics.¹⁹ Moreover, we can recover ξ_j by using the approach in Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005).²⁰ This is very useful for our purpose, since recovered β_i and ξ_j help us to construct buyer-specific match values for internal versus external listings.

Notwithstanding these advantages, there are a couple of potential concerns with our two assumptions. As for the first assumption, one may think that it would be natural to model strategic promotion by restricting the buyer's choice set, instead of introducing implicit costs associated with strategic promotion. However, this would lead to the discrete choice model with random choice sets. Since there are a large number of houses in each market for a buyer to choose among, such a model would require heavy computations, making it infeasible in our setting.

Regarding the second assumption, a legitimate concern is that the presence of strategic promotion implies that the buyer may make suboptimal choices with respect to X_j and ξ_j , in which case the first order conditions in (8) may not hold. We allow for this possibility by introducing optimization errors as follows.

$$\beta_{i,k} = \nu_i \frac{\partial \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial x_{j,k}}, \text{ and } \beta_{i,0} = \nu_i \frac{\partial \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial \xi_j}, \quad (9)$$

where ν_i 's are random variables with positive support and unit mean.²¹ With the presence of ν_i , the choice of (X_{j^*}, ξ_{j^*}) may not lead to the highest utility for buyer i . However, as long as ν_i 's are not correlated with X_j and ξ_j , we can still recover buyer-specific preferences. To see this, note that the price function in the hedonic framework captures the equilibrium prices, rather than some absolute function which is fixed across markets. Therefore, if buyers' choices are determined by (9) instead of (8), the resulting equilibrium prices will be different from the equilibrium prices associated

¹⁹We do so by following Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005) who propose an approach based on a nonparametric estimation of the price function. See Appendix for the description of our estimation method.

²⁰Bajari and Benkard (2005) show that if we assume that ξ_j represents a composite of all unobserved features of the house, that u_i is strictly increasing in ξ_j , and that X_j is independent of ξ_j , then ξ_j can be recovered during the first-stage estimation of the price function. This approach is described in Appendix.

²¹This type of optimization error is considered in Reiss and Wolak (2007).

with (8), in which case the price function we can recover is not $\mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})$, but $\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})$, where $\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*}) = \nu_{j^*} \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})$ and $\nu_{j^*} = \nu_i$ for buyer i who has chosen j^* . Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from recovering buyer-specific preferences, because once we locally identify the slope of $\tilde{\mathbf{p}}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})$, we can locally recover β_i by

$$\beta_{i,k} = \frac{\partial \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial x_{j,k}}, \text{ and } \beta_{i,0} = \frac{\partial \tilde{\mathbf{p}}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial \xi_j}.$$

Thus, as long as potential suboptimal choices with respect to X_j and ξ_j are represented by optimization errors as above, our hedonic framework still allows us to recover buyer-specific preferences.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first attempt to recover buyer-specific preferences and particularly idiosyncratic match values for internal versus external listings in the home matching process intermediated by real estate agents. Although a full-equilibrium model of brokerage choice interacted with house choice is more desirable, this is beyond the scope of the current paper, given our strict focus on recovering the extent of strategic promotion and the significant computational complexity that a full-equilibrium model may entail. However, we do hope that future research in this area will improve upon our approach by developing more generalized models with less restrictive assumptions.

6.1.2 Constructing Counterfactual Match Values

Once we locally recover buyer-specific preferences, β_{ik} , and unobserved house characteristic, ξ_j , buyer i 's match value for the purchased house j can be computed as follows:

$$U_j(\beta_i) = \sum_{k=1}^m \beta_{i,k} x_{j,k} + \beta_{i,0} \xi_j - p_j. \quad (10)$$

Let $V^1(\beta_i)$ and $V^0(\beta_i)$ respectively denote buyer i 's match values for internal listings and external listings. The calculation in (10) then allows us to recover $V^1(\beta_i)$ for buyers in in-house transactions and $V^0(\beta_i)$ for buyers in cross-house transactions. However, to construct counterfactual $V^0(\beta_i)$ (or $V^1(\beta_i)$) for buyers in in-house (or cross-house) transactions, we need to know what other external (or internal) listings these buyers considered when searching for houses.

From the model constructed above, it follows that the buyer's choice of a house with (X_{j^*}, ξ_{j^*}) must be either optimal or close to being optimal (with optimization error ν_i). Thus, for a buyer who bought an internal listing, we can construct her counterfactual match value for external listings by using econometric matching techniques (e.g. Heckman, et al. 1997, 1998) that put higher weights on the houses with similar characteristics (in terms of both X_j and ξ_j) as house j^* and lower or zero weights on those with different characteristics. Specifically, for a given buyer i who bought house j^* through an in-house transaction, we first compute $U_s(\beta_i) = \sum_{k=1}^m \beta_{i,k} x_{s,k} + \beta_{i,0} \xi_s - p_s$ for $s \in D_i^0$, where D_i^0 denotes a set of external listings in the same market. We then compute the weighted average of $U_s(\beta_i)$ using econometric matching techniques. Similarly, we can construct counterfactual match values of internal listings for buyers in cross-house transactions.

Note that it is possible that external (or internal) listings on the market did not include any house with similar characteristics as house j^* that the buyer purchased through an in-house (or cross-house) transaction, in which case we cannot construct counterfactual match values of external (or internal) listings. Nevertheless, this case provides information on matching efficiency, in that such a transaction must be optimal given the lack of desired house in the alternative listings.

6.1.3 Recovering Implicit Costs Associated with Strategic Promotion

In the second stage, the buyer makes a decision on whether purchase an in-house listing ($d_j = 1$). Four possible cases can occur in the second stage. The first is that houses with characteristics (X_{j^*}, ξ_{j^*}) or similar characteristics are available only among internal listings, in which case the buyer will choose $d_j = 1$. The second is that such houses are available only among external listings, in which case the buyer will choose $d_j = 0$. In the remaining two cases, both internal listings and external listings include such houses, so that we can compute $V^1(\beta_i)$ and $V^0(\beta_i)$. If $V^1(\beta_i) + \gamma_i \geq V^0(\beta_i) - c_i$, the buyer will choose $d_j = 1$, whereas if $V^1(\beta_i) + \gamma_i < V^0(\beta_i) - c_i$, the buyer will choose $d_j = 0$.

Clearly the first two cases entail efficient transactions. Combining the remaining two cases yields

$$d_{j^*} = 1 \text{ (or } = 0) \quad \Rightarrow \quad V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i) + \gamma_i + c_i \geq 0 \text{ (or } < 0). \quad (11)$$

The inequality in (11) illustrates three key sources behind in-house transactions. The first is $V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i)$, reflecting the positive utility gain that a buyer obtains from internal listings versus external listings. If $V^1(\beta_i) \geq V^0(\beta_i)$, an in-house transaction delivers an efficient matching because an internal listing generates a larger utility for a given buyer relative to external listings. The second is γ_i , capturing transaction efficiencies from in-house transactions other than the utility gain reflected by $V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i)$. The third is c_i , which is the extra cost of searching for external listings under agents' strategic promotion. Thus, an in-house transaction could be efficient if it generates a better and/or quicker matching outcome for buyer i (i.e., $V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i) + \gamma_i \geq 0$). On the other hand, an in-house transaction could be inefficient if it purely results from agents' strategic promotion (i.e., $V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i) + \gamma_i < 0$ and $V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i) + \gamma_i + c_i \geq 0$).

Thus efficient in-house transactions can be computed as the sum of in-house transactions for which $V^1(\beta_i) \geq V^0(\beta_i)$ as well as transactions for which buyers' optimal houses can only be found among internal listings. Accordingly, the remaining in-house transactions with $V^1(\beta_i) < V^0(\beta_i)$ provides an upper bound on the magnitude of strategic promotion in explaining in-house transactions.

This upper bound provides useful information, but to obtain more information on the extent of strategic promotion, we need to estimate the distribution of γ_i and c_i . To this end, we follow Bajari and Kahn (2005) and impose a parametric assumption to estimate a discrete choice model based on the inequality in (11). Note that we do not attempt to fully separate c_i from γ_i , since it would require strong and arbitrary assumptions. We instead focus on the marginal effect of strategic promotion by further exploiting the difference-in-differences strategy discussed in Section 5.

6.2 Results from Structural Estimation

Our estimation involves three steps. In the first step, we estimate the hedonic price function non-parametrically and recover unobserved house heterogeneity, ξ_j . We further recover buyer-specific preference, β_i , using the first-order conditions in (8). In the second step, we compute buyer-specific match values for internal listings and external listings, V^1 and V^0 . In the third step, we estimate implicit costs associated with strategic promotion. See Appendix for the estimation details.

As discussed in the previous subsection, once we recover V^1 and V^0 , we can quantify the extent of efficient matching by comparing the idiosyncratic match value that a buyer obtains from internal and from external listings. Panel A of Table 7 reports that among all the in-house transactions, the fraction of efficient matching is 0.643 for our sample period, indicating that 64.3% of buyers purchased houses from internal listings because they derive higher utility from internal listings than external listings. This percentage is 62% for the pre-REBBA sample and 68.1% for the post-REBBA sample, suggesting that the policy has improved efficient matching, possibly by discouraging strategic behavior to some extent. The estimate of 64.3% also implies that 35.7% of buyers end up purchasing a house from internal listings even though their interest is best matched by a house listed by other brokerages, indicating the extent of strategic promotion.

Note that this definition of efficient matching is an indication of the matching *outcome* rather than agents' *intention*. That is, even if an agent makes strategic effort to promote internal listings, the resulted in-house transaction is still considered efficient as long as the internal listing provides better match value for the buyer than external listings. In this sense, 35.7% should be considered as a lower bound for agents' strategic behavior in the sample market. On the other hand, 35.7% should also be considered as an upper bound for the actual suboptimal outcome resulted from strategic promotions. As we discussed earlier, when a buyer purchases an internal listing that does not match her preference best, it could be either because the buyer is constrained in her choice set due to agents' strategic promotion or because the buyer values transaction cost savings generated from an in-house

transaction. Later in this section, we will introduce exogenous variations to further distinguish between these two forces.

Panel B of Table 7 reports the fraction of efficient matching among all the cross-house transactions. This includes cross-house transactions with $V^1 < V^0$ as well as transactions for which buyers' optimal houses can only be found externally. In theory, all cross-house transactions should be optimal, but in practice, our approach may also yield suboptimal cross-house transactions in that $V^1 > V^0$. Table 7 shows that 95.3% of cross-house transactions are efficient, which assures that our approach is reasonable.

To further examine the determinants of efficiencies generated from in-house transactions, we use the sample of in-house transactions and regress the utility gain that a buyer obtains from internal versus external listings, measured by $V^1 - V^0$ (in 100,000), on the dummy for the REBBA and $\ln(\#listings)$, that is, the number of district-level monthly listings owned by the buyer's cooperating brokerage, as well as the indicator for top 10 franchises among cooperating brokerages, controlling for house characteristics, transaction period, district and brokerage fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 8. The table shows that the coefficients on $\ln(\#listings)$ and the top 10 franchise dummy are positive and statistically significant, indicating that larger firms tend to produce better internal matches. This finding is strongly in line with Prediction 2 of our theory – in a market where matching is characterized by increasing returns to scale, the efficiency loss resulted from an in-house transaction is smaller for larger brokerage firms. Intuitively, this is because with a larger pool of listings, brokerage firms are more likely to offer a listing that is close to a buyer's ideal house and hence reducing the possibility of mismatch. The coefficient on the REBBA is statistically significant and is about 0.06 in all two columns, indicating that the average utility gain from purchasing an internal listing (relative to an external listing) is increased by about \$6,000. As expected, the disclosure requirement increases the average matching efficiency resulted from in-house transactions, consistent with the hypothesis that the legislation has reduced the extent of strategic promotions.

Now that we recovered $V^1 - V^0$, we further attempt to quantify the extent of strategic promotion controlling for possible transaction efficiencies. To this end, we use the step 3 estimation approach described in Appendix and estimate the logit model based on the inequality in (11). To identify the effect of strategic promotion, we again apply the difference-in-differences approach discussed in the reduced-form analysis. Specifically, we examine differences in implicit search cost, c_i , across transactions with different commission rates/structure before and after the implementation of the REBBA. Let Z_i denote a vector of variables related to search cost (c_i) but not related to transaction savings (γ_i), and W_i denote a vector of variables related to transaction savings (γ_i) but possibly related to search cost (c_i) as well. We thus include commission variables and their interactions with the REBBA in Z_i , while including #listings and days on the market in W_i .

Table 9 presents the results from estimating the logit model. In all specifications, we set the coefficient on $V^1 - V^0$ equal to 1, consistent with the inequality model in (11). Column 1 presents the baseline results. The coefficients on the split dummy and the low commission dummy are significantly positive, suggesting that agents are more likely to promote internal listings (and thereby increasing buyers' cost of searching for external listings) when they split commissions on the per-transaction basis. Such effect is much stronger when agents receive lower commission fees from listing agents. Moreover, the commission effects are reduced substantially after the implementation of the REBBA.

In columns 1-2, we attempt to control for potential savings in transaction costs. Two natural controls for cost savings are the number of listings that the cooperating brokerage owns and the time on the market that a buyer spends on searching. While the former can be constructed relatively easily given a buyer's search range, the latter is not observed. However, we have information about sellers' time on the market for each transaction. To the extent that buyers' and sellers' time on the market are strongly positively correlated (Genesove and Han, 2012a), sellers' time on the market should serve as a good control for transaction efficiencies. Column 1 includes only the number of internal listings, while column 2 includes both control variables. The estimates are similar in both columns, suggesting

that transaction cost savings associated with in-house transactions are unlikely to bias our estimates for strategic promotion. In column 3, we further include the total number of district-level monthly listings of all brokerages to control for overall market conditions. The results again remain robust.

As in the reduced-form analysis, our identification strategy here requires that no other commission related factors differentially affect the incidence of in-house transactions at the same time as the REBBA was implemented. To further control for the possible changes in house or brokerage characteristics that could be correlated with potential commission changes at the time of REBBA, we include the recovered ξ_j (house unobserved heterogeneity) and its interaction with the REBBA dummy in column 4; and franchise fixed effects interacted with the REBBA dummy in column 5.²² In both cases, the estimates remain close to those in column 1, both in magnitude and in precision, suggesting that the estimates are fairly robust.

The estimates reported in Table 9 also allow us to quantify the implicit cost of searching for external listings due to agents' strategic promotion. To provide a benchmark, we first compute the median of $V^1 - V^0$ as a measure of utility gain/loss that a buyers derives from purchasing an internal listing versus an external listing. Using the sample of in-house transactions with $V^1 > V^0$, Panel A of Table 10 shows that the median of $V^1 - V^0$ is about \$25,501,²³ indicating that these transactions are indeed matching efficient, as they deliver a utility gain of \$25,501 for an average home buyer (compared to the case where the buyer purchases an external listing). On the other hand, for the sample of in-house transactions with $V^1 < V^0$, the number becomes -\$18,440, indicating a substantial mismatch between buyers and the internal listings they bought.

To quantify the magnitude of the implicit cost c_i imposed by agents, we use the coefficient estimates on commission variables, which are hypothesized to affect the extent of in-house transactions due to agents' incentives but not to transaction efficiencies. We further restrict our attention to transactions

²²Ideally, we wish to include brokerage fixed effects and their interactions with the REBBA dummy, but given that there are over 1,500 brokerage firms, including brokerage fixed effects in the discrete choice model is not tractable. As a result, we use franchise fixed effects instead.

²³Note that this is interpreted in dollar values, since $U_j(\beta_i)$ is linear in house price.

for which $\text{split} = 1$ and $\text{low.commission} = 1$, and $\text{rebba} = 0$. Table 10 shows that the median of implicit costs associated with agents' promotion is \$19,467. Note that this implicit cost should be interpreted not only as the extra cost that a buyer incurs when looking for a house from the pool of external listings, but also as a shadow price that her agent virtually adds to the price of external listings. The latter concept is similar to the "virtual price" of unavailable goods, which is introduced in the literature that analyzes rationing (Hicks 1940; Rothbarth 1941) and new goods (Hausman 1996, 1999). For the sample in Panel A (in-house transactions with $V^1 > V^0$), agents' strategic interest does not lead to a distortion in the home search process, because home buyers' *ex ante* preference for internal listings agrees with agents' incentive to strategically promote. This is consistent with our theoretical conjecture about efficient in-house transactions. However, this is not the case for the sample in Panel B (in-house transactions with $V^1 < V^0$). In the latter case, even though a buyer's preference is best matched by an external listing, the expected utility gain from purchasing externally is not sufficient to outweigh the associated cost imposed by the agent's strategic promotion, and hence, the resulting in-house matching is suboptimal.

Lastly, to investigate the effect of the REBBA on strategic in-house transactions, we first compute the predicted probabilities of in-house transactions using our samples.²⁴ Panel A of Table 11 reports the mean of these probabilities for the period before and after the REBBA. It shows that the fraction of in-house transactions has declined from 19.4% to 17.4%. We then compute the counterfactual probabilities of in-house transactions in the absence of the REBBA, and find that the mean of these probabilities is 18.8% as reported in Panel B. Therefore, in the absence of REBBA, the fraction of in-house transactions would have been 18.8%, instead of 17.4%. These results indicate that REBBA has weakened the impact of strategic promotion on buyers' home search process, which accounts for 70% of a decrease in in-house transactions before and after the REBBA.

²⁴For in-house (or cross-house) transactions that we cannot match similar external (or internal) listings, cross-house (or in-house) transactions are impossible, and so their predicted probabilities of in-house transactions are set equal to 1 (or 0).

7 Conclusion

Over 20% of residential real estate transactions in North America occur within the same brokerage office. In this paper, we examine the causes and implications of in-house transactions for home buyers. We find that real estate agents are more likely to be engaged in in-house transactions when they are financially motivated, and this effect is weakened after the implementation of the REBBA. These findings are consistent with an agent-intermediated search model and provide strong evidence for the presence of strategic promotions.

To quantify the extent of in-house transactions that occur for strategic reasons, we propose a structural approach to recover the match values that a home buyer obtains from internal listings and external listings, which allows us to explicitly control for possible matching efficiencies. Our estimates suggest that about 64.3% of in-house transactions provide an efficient matching outcome, while the remaining in-house transactions are likely caused by strategic promotion. The latter cause a utility loss for home buyers, indicated by a substantial increase in search cost imposed by agents when these buyers search for external listings. Lastly, the REBBA has weakened the impact of agents' strategic promotion on the home matching process, significantly accounting for the decrease in in-house transactions before and after the regulatory change.

These findings are particularly relevant in the current housing markets as most states in the U.S. have now required agency disclosure, indicating a regulatory reliance on disclosure to reduce inefficiency resulted from in-house sales. Our result suggests that the legislation does have desired effects by helping homebuyers make more informed choices and by constraining agents' ability to strategically promote. However, it cannot completely eliminate information inefficiencies, possibly due to the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing the required disclosure.

Appendix: Details on Three-Step Estimation Approach

To estimate our model, we follow and modify the estimation approach used by Bajari and Kahn (2005) which involves three steps. The first step estimates the hedonic price function using nonparametric methods, and recovers buyer-specific utility parameters β_i . In the second step, we estimate $V^1(\beta_i)$ and $V^0(\beta_i)$. In the third step, we estimate the distribution of γ_i and c_i . In what follows, we describe our approach in detail. We also provide discussion on identification where applicable.

Step 1: estimating the price function and recovering ξ_j and β_i

In the first step, we recover the slope of the price function in a local neighborhood of the characteristics of house j^* chosen by buyer i . To this end, we use a nonparametric estimation of the hedonic price function, and in particular, we use the local linear regression.²⁵

Following Bajari and Kahn (2005), we consider a linear approximation of $\mathbf{p}_t(X_j, \xi_j)$ in a local neighborhood of house j^* 's observed characteristics. Specifically, we consider

$$\log(\mathbf{p}_t(X_j, \xi_j)) = \alpha_{j,0} + \sum_{k=1}^m \alpha_{j,k} x_{j,k} + \eta_t + \xi_j, \quad (12)$$

where $\alpha_j = (\alpha_{j,0}, \dots, \alpha_{j,m})$ is a vector of the hedonic coefficients, η_t captures market fixed effects, and we use a logarithm of the price function instead of its level in order to improve the fitting of the price function. In our estimation, we first regress $\log(p_j)$ on X_j , district fixed effects, and year \times month fixed effects. We then use the demeaned prices, $\widetilde{\log(p_j)} \equiv \log(p_j) - \hat{\eta}_t$, and estimate α_{j^*} for each value of $j = 1, \dots, J_t$ by using local fitting methods which solve

$$\min_{\alpha} \sum_{j=1}^{J_t} \left\{ \widetilde{\log(p_j)} - \alpha_0 - \sum_{k=1}^m \alpha_k x_{j,k} \right\}^2 K_B(X_j - X_{j^*}), \quad (13)$$

where $K_B(\mathbf{v})$ is the kernel function. Given $K_B(X_j - X_{j^*})$, α_{j^*} can be estimated by weighted least squares for each j^* . As for $K_B(\mathbf{v})$, we use the product of univariate Gaussian kernel, following Bajari

²⁵Fan and Gijbels (1996) provide detailed treatment on local linear (or polynomial) regression. We could instead use other nonparametric methods such as a kernel estimator (e.g. Nadaraya-Watson estimator or Gasser-Müller estimator) or a series estimator. However, Bajari and Benkard (2005) found that a local linear kernel estimator as in Fan and Gijbels (1996) worked best. For this reason, we also use the local linear regression.

and Kahn (2005) who used $K_B(\mathbf{v}) = \prod_{k=1}^m \frac{1}{b} N(\frac{1}{b} \frac{v_k}{\hat{\sigma}_k})$, where b is a scalar bandwidth, $N(\cdot)$ is the univariate Gaussian kernel, and $\hat{\sigma}_k$ is the sample standard deviation of v_k .

Once we estimate α_{j^*} , we can recover an estimate of ξ_{j^*} . Following Bajari and Benkard (2005) and Bajari and Kahn (2005), we recover an estimate of ξ_{j^*} from the residual in (12), which yields

$$\xi_{j^*} = \log(p_{j^*}) - \alpha_{j^*,0} - \sum_{k=1}^m \alpha_{j^*,k} x_{j^*,k} - \eta_t.$$

We then use (8) to recover $\beta_{i,k}$ as follows.

$$\hat{\beta}_{i,k} = \frac{\partial \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial x_{j,k}} = \frac{\partial \log(\mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*}))}{\partial x_{j,k}} \times p_{j^*} = \hat{\alpha}_{j^*,k} \times p_{j^*}, \quad \forall k = 1, \dots, m.$$

To recover $\beta_{i,0}$, the coefficient on ξ_j in (7), we use a similar equation as above. Since $\frac{\partial \log(\mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*}))}{\partial \xi_j} = 1$ in (12), we can easily recover $\beta_{i,0}$ by $\hat{\beta}_{i,0} = \frac{\partial \mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*})}{\partial \xi_j} = \frac{\partial \log(\mathbf{p}_t(X_{j^*}, \xi_{j^*}))}{\partial x_{j,k}} \times p_{j^*} = p_{j^*}$.

Step 2: estimating $V^1(\beta_i)$ and $V^0(\beta_i)$

For in-house transactions, we compute $V^1(\beta_i)$ by plugging the recovered β_i and ξ_j into (10). Similarly, we compute $V^0(\beta_i)$ for cross-house transactions. To estimate $V^0(\hat{\beta}_i)$ for buyer i with $d_{j^*} = 1$ and $V^1(\hat{\beta}_i)$ for buyer i with $d_{j^*} = 0$, we need to compute the weighted mean of $U_s(\beta_i)$ by putting higher weights on houses with similar characteristics as house j^* , while putting lower or no weights on houses with different characteristics. For this reason, we use a local linear matching method²⁶ to estimate $E[U_s(\beta_i)|s \in D_i^0]$ for buyer i with $d_{j^*} = 1$ and $E[U_s(\beta_i)|s \in D_i^1]$ for buyer i with $d_{j^*} = 0$. Specifically, the local linear weighted mean is given by the intercept μ_0 in the minimization problem

$$\min_{\mu_0, \mu_1} \sum_{s \in D_i^{1-d_{j^*}}} \{U_s(\beta_i) - \mu_0 - (X_s - X_{j^*})' \mu_1\}^2 K_B(X_s - X_{j^*}) \times K_b(\xi_s - \xi_{j^*}),$$

where $K_B(\mathbf{v})$ is defined above, $K_b(v) = \frac{1}{b} N(\frac{1}{b} \frac{v}{\hat{\sigma}_k})$, and D_i^1 (or D_i^0) denotes a set of internal (or external) listings in the same market, so that if $d_{j^*} = 1$, we compute the local linear weighted mean by using houses in $D_i^{1-d_{j^*}} = D_i^0$.

²⁶See, e.g., Heckman, et al. (1997, 1998) and Hong (2013) for more details on a local linear matching method.

Step 3: estimating the distribution of γ_i and c_i

To obtain more information on the extent of strategic promotion, we need to estimate the distribution of γ_i and c_i . To this end, we use (11) and impose a parametric assumption on the distribution of $\delta_i = \gamma_i + c_i$. Hence, we do not attempt to fully separate c_i from γ_i , but instead focus on the marginal effect of strategic promotion by using exclusion restrictions and a natural experiment from a policy change. Let us begin by considering the following specifications for γ_i and c_i :

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_i &= \gamma_0 + W_{1,i}\lambda_1 + W_{2,i}\lambda_2 + \epsilon_i, \\ c_i &= c_0 + Z_i\theta_1 + W_{2,i}\theta_2 + \omega_i,\end{aligned}\tag{14}$$

where γ_0 and c_0 are the intercepts, ϵ_i and ω_i are the error terms, and W_i is a vector of variables related to transaction costs, but $W_{1,i}$ is only related to transaction costs, while $W_{2,i}$ is related to both transaction costs and strategic promotion. In (14), Z_i is a vector of variables related to strategic promotion but not related to transaction costs. Though we use excluded variables Z_i that only affect strategic promotion, we cannot separately identify γ_i and c_i , because we cannot distinguish γ_0 from c_0 without further restrictions, and $W_{2,i}$ enters both γ_i and c_i .

Therefore, our main approach for the step 3 considers $\delta_i = \gamma_i + c_i$ as follows:

$$\delta_i = \delta_0 + Z_i\theta_1 + W_{1,i}\delta_1 + W_{2,i}\delta_2 + \eta_i,\tag{15}$$

where $\delta_0 = \gamma_0 + c_0$, $\delta_1 = \lambda_1$, $\delta_2 = \lambda_2 + \theta_2$, and $\eta_i = \epsilon_i + \omega_i$. Hence, as long as we have excluded variables Z_i , we can identify and estimate the marginal effect of strategic promotion due to changes in Z_i . If we do not impose any assumption on η_i , we can obtain bounds on θ_1 . To obtain point identification, we follow Bajari and Kahn (2005) and impose a parametric distribution on η_i . However, note that the identification of θ_1 does not rely on a particular parametric assumption for η_i . In our application, we assume a logistic distribution, simply because it is straightforward to estimate the model. We thus

estimate the parameters using the following likelihood function based on (11):

$$L(\theta_1, \delta) = \prod_i F(V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i) + \delta_0 + Z_i\theta_1 + W_{1,i}\delta_1 + W_{2,i}\delta_2)^{d_j} \\ \times [1 - F(V^1(\beta_i) - V^0(\beta_i) + \delta_0 + Z_i\theta_1 + W_{1,i}\delta_1 + W_{2,i}\delta_2)]^{1-d_j},$$

where $F(\cdot) = \exp(\cdot)/(1 + \exp(\cdot))$.

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Figure 1: Cooperating Brokerage's Fraction of In-House Transactions at District-level




Table 1: Fraction of In-House Transactions by Brokerage Ranking^a

	fraction of in-house	total share by brokerage ranking
ranking.1-10	0.220	0.214
ranking.11-50	0.195	0.333
ranking.51-100	0.161	0.182
ranking.101-200	0.166	0.150
ranking.201-	0.142	0.121
All	0.183	1.000

^aWe rank cooperating brokerages in order of their total market shares in our data. We then group them by their rankings. The “fraction of in-house” means the fraction of in-house transactions among total transactions carried out by brokerages in each ranking group. The “total share by brokerage ranking” refers to the share of each ranking group’s total transactions among all transactions in our data.

Table 2: Fraction of In-House Transactions by #Agents^a

	fraction of in-house	total share by #agents
#agent.501-	0.220	0.093
#agent.201-500	0.182	0.242
#agent.101-200	0.177	0.235
#agent.51-100	0.180	0.151
#agent.11-50	0.189	0.126
#agent.1-10	0.161	0.053
#agent.unknown	0.173	0.100
All	0.183	1.000

^aWe collect information on the number of agents for each brokerage, and group brokerages by the number of agents. The “fraction of in-house” means the fraction of in-house transactions among total transactions carried out by brokerages in each group. The “total share by #agents” refers to the share of each group’s total transactions among all transactions in our data.

Table 3: Fraction of In-House Transactions by Year^a

	fraction of in-house	total share by year
2001	0.202	0.099
2002	0.189	0.115
2003	0.189	0.113
2004	0.186	0.119
2005	0.192	0.117
2006	0.193	0.110
2007	0.177	0.123
2008	0.169	0.093
2009	0.153	0.111
All	0.183	1.000

^aThe “fraction of in-house” means the fraction of in-house transactions among total transactions in each year. The “total share by year” refers to the share of each year’s total transactions among all transactions in our data.

Table 4: Baseline Results for “Difference-in-differences” using REBBA ^a

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
split	0.013*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)			0.011*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)
split × rebba	-0.014*** (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.003)			-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.004)
low.commission			0.050*** (0.005)	0.051*** (0.005)	0.037*** (0.006)	0.037*** (0.006)
low.commission × rebba			-0.014** (0.007)	-0.012* (0.007)	0.005 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
split × low.commission					0.031*** (0.009)	0.031*** (0.009)
split × low.commission × rebba					-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.038*** (0.014)
rebba	-0.030* (0.016)	-0.067*** (0.016)	-0.038** (0.016)	-0.076*** (0.016)	-0.033** (0.016)	-0.071*** (0.016)
#listings	0.009*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.000)	0.008*** (0.000)
house characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
occupancy types	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
listing price	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
year × month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
district fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
\bar{R}^2	0.069	0.070	0.069	0.071	0.069	0.071
observations	206956	206956	206956	206956	206956	206956

^aThe dependent variable is the indicator variable for whether the transaction is in-house. House characteristics include $\ln(\text{lot.front})$, $\ln(\text{lot.depth})$, dummy variables for #bedrooms, #washrooms, and #garages. Occupancy types are the indicator variables for different types of occupants. #listings is the district-level monthly number of listings by the same brokerage as the buyer’s cooperating brokerage. For listing price, we use the logarithm of prices. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** denotes significance at a 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1% level.

Table 5: Robustness Checks to Time-Invariant Unobserved Heterogeneity^a

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
split×low.commission	0.031*** (0.009)	0.035* (0.019)	0.024*** (0.009)	0.022** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.009)
split×low.commission×rebba	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.032 (0.028)	-0.036*** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.014)
house characteristics	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
occupancy types	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
listing price	no	no	no	no	no
year×month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
district fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
house fixed effects	no	yes	no	no	no
brokerage fixed effects	no	no	yes	no	no
brokerage×region	no	no	no	yes	no
brokerage×price range	no	no	no	no	yes
\bar{R}^2	0.069	0.079	0.084	0.087	0.086
observations	206956	81662	206956	206956	206956
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
split×low.commission	0.031*** (0.009)	0.035* (0.019)	0.024*** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)	0.024*** (0.009)
split×low.commission×rebba	-0.038*** (0.014)	-0.031 (0.028)	-0.034** (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)	-0.034** (0.014)
house characteristics	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
occupancy types	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
listing price	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year×month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
district fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
house fixed effects	no	yes	no	no	no
brokerage fixed effects	no	no	yes	no	no
brokerage×region	no	no	no	yes	no
brokerage×price range	no	no	no	no	yes
\bar{R}^2	0.071	0.079	0.086	0.089	0.087
observations	206956	81662	206956	206956	206956

^aThe dependent variable is the indicator variable for whether the transaction is in-house. House characteristics include $\ln(\text{lot.front})$, $\ln(\text{lot.depth})$, dummy variables for #bedrooms, #washrooms, and #garages. Occupancy types are the indicator variables for different types of occupants. #listings is the district-level monthly number of listings by the same brokerage as the buyer's cooperating brokerage. For listing price, we use the logarithm of prices. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** denotes significance at a 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1% level.

Table 6: Robustness Checks to Time-Varying Unobserved Heterogeneity^a

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
split×low.commission	0.031*** (0.009)	0.063** (0.025)	0.020** (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)
split×low.commission×rebba	-0.040*** (0.014)	-0.089** (0.044)	-0.032** (0.014)	-0.031** (0.014)	-0.033** (0.014)
house characteristics	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
occupancy types	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
listing price	no	no	no	no	no
year×month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
district fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
house×rebba fixed effects	no	yes	no	no	no
brokerage×rebba fixed effects	no	no	yes	no	no
brokerage×region×rebba	no	no	no	yes	no
brokerage×price range×rebba	no	no	no	no	yes
\bar{R}^2	0.069	0.086	0.085	0.088	0.087
observations	206956	41132	206956	206956	206956
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
split×low.commission	0.031*** (0.009)	0.063** (0.025)	0.020** (0.009)	0.019** (0.009)	0.021** (0.009)
split×low.commission×rebba	-0.038*** (0.014)	-0.089** (0.044)	-0.031** (0.014)	-0.030** (0.014)	-0.032** (0.014)
house characteristics	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
occupancy types	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
listing price	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year×month fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
district fixed effects	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
house×rebba fixed effects	no	yes	no	no	no
brokerage×rebba fixed effects	no	no	yes	no	no
brokerage×region×rebba	no	no	no	yes	no
brokerage×price range×rebba	no	no	no	no	yes
\bar{R}^2	0.071	0.087	0.086	0.090	0.088
observations	206956	41132	206956	206956	206956

^aThe dependent variable is the indicator variable for whether the transaction is in-house. House characteristics include $\ln(\text{lot.front})$, $\ln(\text{lot.depth})$, dummy variables for #bedrooms, #washrooms, and #garages. Occupancy types are the indicator variables for different types of occupants. #listings is the district-level monthly number of listings by the same brokerage as the buyer's cooperating brokerage. For listing price, we use the logarithm of prices. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** denotes significance at a 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1% level.

Table 7: Fraction of Efficient Transactions ^a

A. among in-house transactions	
before the REBBA was implemented	0.620
after the REBBA was implemented	0.681
both periods	0.643
B. among cross-house transactions	
before REBBA was implemented	0.956
after REBBA was implemented	0.949
both periods	0.953

^aEfficient in-house transactions include in-house transactions with $V^1 > V^0$ as well as in-house transactions for which similar external listings cannot be found. Similarly, efficient cross-house transactions include cross-house transactions with $V^1 < V^0$ as well as cross-house transactions for which similar internal listings cannot be found.

Table 8: Regressions of $V^1 - V^0$ for In-House Transactions ^a

	(1)	(2)
rebba	0.0613*	0.0660**
	(0.0324)	(0.0316)
ln(#listings)	0.0528***	0.0522***
	(0.0036)	(0.0035)
top10.coop.franchise	0.0975***	0.0896***
	(0.0147)	(0.0143)
year×month	yes	yes
district	yes	yes
house characteristics	no	yes
\bar{R}^2	0.222	0.261
observations	33853	33853

^aThe dependent variable is $V^1 - V^0$ (in 100,000). The regressions are estimated by using only in-house transactions, so that $V^1 - V^0$ in these regressions measures the efficiency gain for internal listings relative to external listings. We use observations for which we can estimate V^1 and V^0 . #listings is the district-level monthly number of listings by the same brokerage as the buyer's cooperating brokerage. top10.coop.franchise is the dummy variable for whether the cooperating brokerage of the transaction belongs to top 10 cooperating brokerage firms. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 5% level, and ** denotes significance at a 1% level.

Table 9: Step 3 Estimation Results^a

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
split×low.commission	0.384*** (0.130)	0.380*** (0.130)	0.380*** (0.130)	0.371*** (0.129)	0.371*** (0.129)
split×low.commission×rebba	-0.501*** (0.181)	-0.499*** (0.181)	-0.499*** (0.181)	-0.471*** (0.181)	-0.424** (0.182)
split	0.196*** (0.031)	0.195*** (0.031)	0.195*** (0.031)	0.176*** (0.031)	0.176*** (0.031)
split×rebba	-0.716*** (0.047)	-0.716*** (0.047)	-0.716*** (0.047)	-0.720*** (0.047)	-0.943*** (0.055)
low.commission	0.181** (0.084)	0.178** (0.084)	0.178** (0.084)	0.172** (0.084)	0.169** (0.084)
low.commission×rebba	-0.116 (0.123)	-0.115 (0.123)	-0.115 (0.123)	-0.054 (0.123)	-0.030 (0.123)
rebba	-1.698*** (0.193)	-1.693*** (0.193)	-1.692*** (0.193)	3.906*** (1.218)	3.270*** (1.250)
#listings	0.024*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.023*** (0.001)
days.on.market		0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
#total.listings			-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
ξ_j				1.002*** (0.076)	1.006*** (0.076)
$\xi_j \times rebba$				0.503*** (0.111)	0.467*** (0.112)
house characteristics	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
occupancy types	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
year×month	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
district	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
franchise×rebba	no	no	no	no	yes
observations	50412	50412	50412	50412	50409

^aThe dependent variable is the indicator variable for whether the transaction is in-house or not. We use observations for which we can estimate V^1 and V^0 . The coefficient on $V^1 - V^0$ (in 100,000) is set equal to 1. #listings is the district-level monthly number of listings by the same brokerage as the buyer's cooperating brokerage. #total.listings is the district-level monthly number of listings of all brokerages. The results are estimated by logit. Column 4 is estimated by a conditional fixed-effect logit model, so that it uses only houses which alternate in-house transactions and cross-house transactions in different transactions. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at a 10% level, ** denotes significance at a 5% level, and *** denotes significance at 1% level.

Table 10: Utility Gain and Implicit Costs of In-House Transactions^a

A. in-house transactions with $V^1 > V^0$	
median of $V^1 - V^0$	25,501
median of implicit costs implied from step 3 estimates	19,467
B. in-house transactions with $V^1 < V^0$	
median of $V^1 - V^0$	-18,440
median of implicit costs implied from step 3 estimates	19,467

^aUtility gains are computed by $V^1 - V^0$, while the implicit costs are calculated by using the coefficient estimates from column 3 in Table 9. We use the sample of in-house transactions with non-zero costs (i.e. split = 1 and low.commission = 1), and compute the medians of $V^1 - V^0$ and the implicit costs.

Table 11: REBBA Effect on Strategic In-House Transactions^a

A. mean predicted prob. of in-house transactions	
before the REBBA	0.194
after the REBBA	0.174
B. mean predicted prob. of in-house transactions without REBBA	
for the sample after the REBBA	0.188
C. % reduction in in-house transactions attributable to the REBBA reducing strategic promotion	
= $(0.188 - 0.174) / (0.194 - 0.174) \times 100\% = 70\%$	

^aPanels A-B report the mean of predicted probabilities of in-house transactions. In Panel B, to compute the mean probability of in-house transactions without the REBBA, we use only the samples after the REBBA and compute the predicted probability of in-house transactions by setting the coefficients on the interactions between the REBBA and commission variables equal zero.