CHAPTER

19

Creativity and its Discontents: The Weary Voyager Model of Creativity in Relation to Self

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INTRODUCTION

The process by which a person produces a creative work has been studied by researchers and theorists who have offered multistage models of creativity. One popular model was proposed by Wallas (1926), who thought that creative products come into being through preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification. Recently, Sadler-Smith (2015) suggested that Wallas' original work (1926) shows evidence of an additional stage, intimation, that links incubation and illumination. Other models followed, among which were Mednick's (1962, 1968) remote association model, Rothenberg's (1988, 1991) homospatial and Janusian thinking model, the eight-stage model of Blair and Mumford (2007) and Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmon, and Doares (1991) that starts with problem construction and ends with solution monitoring, and Geneplore model of Finke, Ward, and Smith (1992). These models depict sequences of processes by which a problem is found and solved, and a creative product is generated. In this chapter, we focus on a problem that comes at the beginning of the process and may be as important as the subsequent set of stages. It's the problem of how creative thoughts emerge, and of how such thoughts are related to the structure of the self.

Once a creative thought comes, it can have many fates. It can be forgotten or pursued; it can be elaborated or jumbled. Sometimes, very rarely, it may be the basis of a Nobel prize–winning scientific advance or a much-loved work of art. While the destiny of creative thought is a formidable

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and fascinating subject, it is the origin of this thought and its relation to self-structure that we consider here. Our approach frames the presence or absence of creativity in relation to self as occurring close to the beginning of our cognitive processes—at the doors of perception.

PERCEPTION OF PAST AND PRESENT

We live in a world of both stability and change. Among stable elements for most of us are loved ones and perhaps the place where we live. Among changing elements are new acquaintances, new technologies, and new pieces of art and entertainment. In evolutionary terms, it seems that the line that led to modern humans divided from the line that led to modern chimpanzees approximately 4 million years ago (Gribbin & Cherfas, 2001). The best index we have of stability and change in the minds of our ancestors during evolutionary time comes from stone tools, which date back to approximately 2.5 million years (Nowell & Davidson, 2010). Although we might often think of technology in terms of gadgets, really we should recognize that every technology, from a house to a piece of writing to a mobile phone, has three aspects: a certain kind of object in the world, skills to produce and use it, and a culture that supports its use (Oatley, 2013). Think of a bicycle: there's the thing itself, skills of production and riding, which include both the physical and the social, and then the cultural arrangements to make the earth flat enough to use wheeled vehicles. As far as stone tools are concerned, since their invention, there was a gradually increasing rate of change (Stout, 2011). The successions of these tools indicate that the minds that made and used them and the cultures in which they were useful could be stable for thousands of years. More recently the pace of change in what minds make has been increasing so that, as discussed by Oatley (2013), the first cave paintings appeared approximately 30,000 years ago, the first cities less than 10,000 years ago, the first writing 5000 years ago, and the first printed books 500 years ago. The first movies appeared not much more than 100 years ago, and the Internet expanded to a world-wide service only approximately 20 years ago. Such changes required creativity in the making, and they have invited creativity in the doings of people's day-to-day lives.

In perception, some cues of retinal images are interpreted by means that have been genetically programmed during our evolutionary past. Other cues are interpreted by means of learning during each person's individual past (Helmholtz, 1866/1962; Hinton, 2007) such that we learn to see a chair as an object to sit on and chopsticks as things to eat with. Learning depends on stability: the past predicts the present, and this has served our species well. But given the increasing rates of change in our recent history, the bias toward concentrating on stability is strong enough

that we might not perceive change, and some demonstrations of this are striking enough to be entertaining. Students in psychology classes have been much engaged by a video in which most of them do not perceive a change that is of a gorilla entering the scene to stroll among players who toss a basketball to each other (Simons & Chabris, 1999), or another video in which they don't notice that someone asking for directions on a busy street has been replaced, after an interruption, by someone entirely different (Simons & Levin, 1998).

Our minds and bodies are tuned for stability, tuned to perceive and react in predictable ways. At the same time we are thrown into a heaving sea of continual change. If we are sometimes unable to be creative, our inability to see an emerging reality, and an inability to act on it, appears to be at the very center of this lack.

The modern-day definition of creativity has two facets: a creative product must be both novel and appropriate/useful/relevant (Kaufman, 2009). The definition fits well the evolutionary challenge just described: how to perceive a complex ever-changing environment and to create products and engagements with them that explore and sometimes solve their complexities, or how to create something lasting such as a painting, a poem, or a dance, as a process of exploration. We map this problem onto the structure of self, and show how difficulties of being creative can arise from difficulties in the configuration of aspects of self-experience.

The model we present here is not quite scientific. To take up a distinction offered by Kozbelt, Beghetto, and Runco (2010), it is metaphorical. It is a model in the way a truck made of Lego blocks is a model. It is made of preexisting parts offered by others. Our contribution is to put them together in a way that we hope will provide interesting and useful insights. And, just as with a Lego truck, we hope that it will be taken apart by creative hands to make more interesting models in the future. Before we can map the problem of difficulties in creativity onto a model of self, we have to assemble a self.

ASSEMBLING A SELF

In his classic conceptualization, James (1890/2007) presented the self as an "I," the subjective agentic self (the doer/knower), and a "Me," the objective representational self (the known). He claimed that only the objective, representational Me is a proper subject of psychological investigation; he focused on it in terms of the construction, perception, cognition, motivation, awareness, and knowledge of self as represented in thought and language. The study of self has, however, expanded beyond James' idea. For instance, as we point out here, there is yet another self that behaves in ways that may not fit what James proposed. It does things no matter what



FIGURE 19.1 **Structure of self.**

the person perceives, thinks, or wants. In the subsequent text we describe three part-selves, whose totality represents a complete Self, depicted as a circle in Fig. 19.1. We assemble our self-model from several theories, and call the model the Weary Voyager because in her travels through life the whole Self, represented as a circle in Fig. 19.1, has to hold apart and carry the heavy weight of narratives she tells about the self, and the heavy weight of experience. We represented these weights as suitcases. They can burden the Voyager and make her too weary to bother much with creativity.

The I Self

In the stick figure of Fig. 19.1, the I represents conscious awareness of selfhood in relation to the environment. It falls asleep when we fall asleep, and wakes up in time to catch a glimpse in the bathroom mirror. This I may be similar to James' (1890/2007) conception of the self-as-knower, but it is more than his self-as-doer. In Fig. 19.1, the I is part of the whole Self, which is represented by the whole circle; this I is both a perceiver and an organizer of knowledge (Greenwald, 1980; Pratkanis & Greenwald, 1985), as well one aspect of self-as-doer. This argument also takes us to a point of distinction between the I presented here and Mead's (1934) "I," which "is the self of unconditioned choice, of undreamt hypotheses, of inventions that change the whole face of nature" (p. 35). According to the model

presented in this chapter, the I's agency, its capacity for making choices, is not unconditioned but is continually affected by and continually affecting the other parts of self, to which we next turn.

The Narrative Self

The representational aspect of self has been thoroughly studied in the 20th century (Cooley, 1902/1922; Goffman, 1959; James, 1902; McAdams, 1993, 1995, 2001; Mead, 1934). Whatever we think, believe, or verbalize about ourselves is in this category. The Narrative Self derives from what Bruner (1986) called the narrative mode of thought, which is about agents, their intentions, and the vicissitudes these intentions meet. He contrasted it with the paradigmatic mode of thought, which is about understanding and explaining how things work in the physical world. The Narrative Self is the only part of Self that is truly temporal; its structures are such that they extend over time. It is continually constructed, and it can become distorted (Gergen & Gergen, 1988; McAdams, 1993, 1995, 2001). It is also unbounded, that is, it can shade naturally into various kinds of nonself (James, 1890/2007).

The Narrative Self is based in language, thought to be perhaps 200,000 years old (Dunbar, 2009). It's our verbalized thoughts about ourselves, thoughts that we may keep to ourselves and sometimes tell to others. Such thoughts include those that the authors of this chapter are writing here about selfhood, and those that you as a reader might have about your selfhood as you read.

In the Narrative Self, the I relates to James' "Me" in the same way that an author of a novel relates to a character, perhaps the narrator, in that novel (Mancuso & Sarbin, 1983; Sarbin, 1986). The idea of a Narrative Self is, indeed, an excellent metaphor for the knower as she is able to construct a story of herself to herself and others. The metaphor emphasizes the infinite number of possible constructions. We can have actual or possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986), undesired selves (Ogilvie, 1987), ideal and ought selves (Higgins, 1987), and individual and collective selves (Simon, 1997). The metaphor also guards against oversimplification in terms of the truth of the narrative. Is the narrator reliable? Are our narrative selves true to us? True to others? Are characters true to the author? The issue of accuracy of the narrative, however, may be better approached not from the perspective of the content of the story, but rather from the motivation of the author, and the degree of distortion that can be introduced into the story to fit the author's motivational goals. The narrative metaphor illustrates the extent to which the Narrative Self can become a story of another who is not really the self, and to this extent the constructed self is unbounded. We can, for instance, read narratives of others and adopt them as if they were us.

The narrative metaphor points to the vulnerability in the conception of Self, given that the step from character-as-narrative-self to self-as-narrative is very small. Within the Narrative Self, it becomes easy to believe that a character is the author, rather than that the character relates to some aspects of the author. Mistaking an agent for a story of an agent—mistaking the whole Self for a story that the I makes about the Self—is very easy, particularly when the narrative metaphor becomes increasingly complex, as Bakhtin (1929/1984) argued, in his *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Bakhtin proposed that Dostoevsky's characters are not dependent on central authorship, but are independent ideological and motivational structures; they in fact have different selves. This means, then, that each character in the kinds of novel about which Bakhtin writes is her own autonomous I. This idea was further elaborated and applied to the self theory by Hermans, Kempen, and Van Loon (1992), who argued that self is a collection of "relatively autonomous 'I' positions within an imaginal landscape" (Hermans, 1996). The psychological understanding of the Narrative Self was thus moved forward by understanding it as a potentially autonomous agentic force. The Narrative Self, does, indeed have causal relations to other components of Self, and the idea of dialogical or multivoiced self (Hermans, 1996) can perhaps be best understood in terms of that interaction. Yet we must guard, in our own minds, against the too-easy supposition that what we think of our self is the entirety of Self.

The Experiential Self

The Experiential Self derives from our genetics and from the history of all imprints that experience has left on us, no matter the stories we weave about ourselves. It is affected by learning, by the fact that experiences leave their marks on our bodies and psyches. In his Cognitive–Experiential Self Theory, which focuses on rational/analytical and holistic information-processing styles, Epstein (1973, 1994) calls this system "experiential." The Experiential Self is the source of our urge to have another piece of chocolate or to make plans to see a certain person in whom we are interested, of our emotions of affection, of anger, of fear, of contempt. It can affect the entirety of the Self that is represented by the circle in Fig. 19.1, to act even if the action violates dictates of the Narrative Self, as, for instance, when a person who has determined to give up drinking has a glass of wine, or two, or when a person who has vowed not to worry over matters about which she can do nothing gets caught in repetitive anxiety. The Experiential Self interacts with the Narrative Self, because experiences affect our verbalizations, and it also interacts with our conscious awareness. It can easily bypass the conscious awareness of the I, and make us act automatically. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) and Bargh and Ferguson (2000) have drawn attention to both activation and pursuit

of unconscious goals, pointing to a large prevalence of automatically activated behaviors.

The temporal nature of the Experiential Self is difficult to understand because we cannot refer to the apparent temporality of experience without thinking verbally about it. If I tasted a sweet cherry when I was 2 years old, an experience that left me with a lifetime predilection for sweet cherries, my experience at that age was atemporal. It was an experience of the I in the now, as is my continuing predilection for sweet cherries in the present day now. Being nonnarrative, it is not constructed. Memory researchers advise us of the constructed nature of our memories (Loftus, 1996; Schacter, 1999). Although it may change rapidly, experience as such is not ambiguous. By contrast, our memories and interpretations of experience are narrative, constructed, and open to ambiguity. Perhaps my memory is flawed. Perhaps I never tasted a sweet cherry when I was aged 2. Perhaps my belief in the causal relation between the memory of experience and my lifelong cherry predilection is false. What I believe is irrelevant to the fact that experience as such can leave imprints, and that these imprints can themselves act as motivating agents. The Experiential Self is affected by the history of these imprints.

The Circle of Self

If we consider the totality of Self, a configuration of three interacting selves, each of which affects the other two, we get the sense of a certain complexity. In Fig. 19.1, this Self is represented as a circle, which can be moved by any of its three parts, or any combination of them. Now that we have assembled the Self, we can show how different configurations produce different kinds of difficulty with creativity.

THE WEARY VOYAGER MODEL

Let us assume that creativity depends on an adaptive response to an accurate perception of a changing reality in the world. This assumption violates the accumulated glamor of creativity as a special and unusual response that is different from what the majority of us could do in everyday life. The aura of specialness or even madness that often characterizes creativity is born of not seeing what creative perception allows; it is like being amazed at a person who is lifted along in the air, and makes strange movements and contortions, but without our being able to see the horse the person is riding. Individuals whose self is configured to see reality more accurately can see the horse, and can even ride it, while the rest of us, unseeing, may be left to imagine stories of madness and magic.

There are three ways in which the accurate perception of reality, which is required for creativity, can fail. These ways are represented in Fig. 19.1 as three ways by which the wayfaring Self is burdened on the path to accurate perception. She can be burdened by self-deception, which can be thought of as the distance, or strain, between the Narrative Self and the Experiential Self. She can be burdened, too, by the weight of the Narrative Self and the weight of the Experiential Self. As you can see from Fig. 19.1, the stick-figure Self holds her two heavy suitcases—the Narrative Self and the Experiential Self—widely apart. In this way, she makes them more difficult to carry. No wonder the Self is weary as she makes her way. To perceive her Self and her doings in the world more accurately she might reduce the strain on her arms by decreasing the distance between her suitcases, and might lighten the load of each one. Were she to do this, she might make her way in a fashion that is less reactive, more creative.

Distance Between Narrative and Experience

Creativity can be thought of as a novel and productive response to reality; it requires accurate perception of that reality. The first problem with the accuracy of self-perception is that narratives, like memories, are constructed representations of experience, and as such are selective. The story of ourselves we tell when we apply for a job is different from the one we tell when we are on a first date; this difference need not be of distortion, only of relevance. But distortion can and does occur. Given that narrative and experience belong to different temporal and ontological categories, one could reasonably ask what it means for a narrative to be distorted. Is it reasonable to use the term "distortion" to describe the relationship between constructed narratives and the experiences they represent? We propose that distortion can be appropriate, but only when referring to the motivational predisposition of the narrator, rather than to the content of the narrated experience. For example, any particular experience is like taking a sip of coffee in a café. The experience can contain limitless bits of information, and these require selection and construction. The narrative is distorted if a particular motivational predisposition leads one selectively to ignore or to attend to a certain set of issues. For example, a fight with a friend will have innumerable aspects, some of which might be ignored consciously or unconsciously. We argue that a narrative of an event is distorted if the person is motivated systematically to discount particular kinds of information, for instance, those that show the friend to be right about some aspect of the argument. This does not refer to a necessarily self-centered perspective while accumulating or organizing our knowledge (Greenwald, 1980), but to motivated distortion. This distortion, when automatically processed, is known as self-deception (Sartre, 1975; Peterson, 1999). Goleman (1996) conceptualizes self-deception as

a psychological version of the endorphin system: it allows us to escape a danger before we are consumed by the pain it produces, and so protects a fragile self-system. Self-deception is not just about the Self. It can be about others, for instance, "they are out to get me," or about the world, "I'm the only one who does any work around here." No matter what the target of self-deception is—self, others, or the world—accurate perception is impaired.

Why should discrepancies between narratives and experience be harmful to creativity? After all, some psychologists argue that constructing one's reality through rose-colored glasses can have positive effects by inspiring optimism, a sense of well-being, and competence (Taylor & Brown, 1988). The problem is similar to that of looking for a city landmark using a map. Even if one finds the landmark on the map, and knows how to use a map, if a person is mistaken about where she or he is according to the map, if she or he does not represent her or his experience accurately, the landmark will not be found. This will be the case even if she or he feels optimistic about being right about her or his location on the map. It is for this reason that self-deception, which in Fig. 19.1 is represented by the distance between the Narrative Self and the Experiential Self, affects accuracy of perception. Accuracy is needed for creative (novel and productive) responses to reality. It would be difficult to find an inventor who made an extraordinary discovery, or a musician who composed a masterpiece, who did not acknowledge distressing truths about some preinventions or compositions as being wrong, or as needing more work, or a myriad of other unpleasant realities, all of which needed to be perceived and addressed, before a creative work was accomplished.

Rigid Attachment to the Narrative Self

One of the most common tests of creative fluency is asking for multiple uses of a simple object such as a pen. It is a part of one of Guilford's (1967) operations—divergent thinking—which includes fluency, flexibility, originality, and elaboration. Langer and Piper (1987) found that when undergraduates were introduced to objects in a conditional manner (e.g., "this could be a pen"), they outperformed undergraduates who were introduced to the same objects unconditionally (e.g., "this is a pen") on measures of creativity that involved using the object for a novel purpose. Narratives of self may function in much the same way. They are necessary as guides for both organizing the past (making chronological meaning of one's life) and future planning, goal orientation, choice making, and so on. Categorical rather than conditional narratives of self are likely to stymie creativity. So what is it about a rigid attachment to a narrative such as "I had a happy childhood" or "I want to be the kind of person who exercises every day" that even when they are accurate (with selection and

processing of information being unaffected by motivational purposes), they can interfere with perception, and hence with creativity? We propose that the level of resolution for many narratives to which we are rigidly attached is often too low to maintain accuracy over a continually changing present—any story that is broad and rigid will eventually lead to its own distortion, which will weigh us down.

Let us start with the past. A rigid attachment to a narrative of the past (e.g., "I had a happy childhood") factifies that past, ignoring both the constructed nature of our remembering and the continually emerging nature of Self. The motivational changes that occur during adulthood require reunderstandings of narratives of the past, so that it can inform the present in a clearer manner. The continually emerging present requires fluidity in understanding of how the past informs it. Ideally, the past would be covered by a narrative as flexible and light as a translucent veil, so that newly emerging goals and circumstances can be informed by peering through the veil and gathering content that will best inform us. If a significant part of the narrative past is just a never-changing lump, we cannot accurately perceive either the past or the present.

In terms of the narratives of the future—our goals and plans that inform our daily action—the situation is similar. We argue against rigid attachment to future narratives of the self, even if the content of the narratives appears to be good. For example, let us examine a narrative of wanting to be a kind person. Some would argue that rigid attachment to the positive future narratives epitomizes uniquely human ability for self-improvement. The problem, again, is in the motivated necessity of needing to be (and to see oneself as) a person who is kind. One can be kind, and believe that for the most part one is kind. But if one incessantly needs to be and believes oneself to be such an ought self (Higgins, 1987), it becomes more difficult to perceive the continually changing nature of what is, and to act upon it.

The weight of a rigid narrative of self can be seen as an obstacle for creative achievers. Once being creative becomes an identity rather than a flexibly creative state of being, it can produce the very rigidity of a Narrative Self that can block further production. This occurs in the anguish over creative blocks from which many artists suffer. The very doubt about their own creative capacity, and the compensatory attachment to the artist identity, can begin a cycle of rigidity, doubt, more rigidity, and more doubt, while the subtleties of the emerging self in relation to emerging world remain unnoticed.

Rigid Attachment to the Experiential Self

The weight of experience can be framed within the evolutionary perspective discussed previously. The relative stability of the environment

has favored stability in learning outcomes that can sometimes persist for longer than is adaptive in the light of changing circumstances. The body and brain, which hold these patterns, rely on perception and they are contributors to perception. Groopman and Prichard (2007) have observed that doctors who see a particular ailment many times in a row can misdiagnose a new patient because they more easily perceive the new syndrome as the pattern that has become familiar. Similarly, Duncker (1945) showed that individuals' familiarity with the way that objects are traditionally used prevents them from solving problems that would require a novel use. He called it "functional fixedness." A person sent to a company to solve a challenging situation may be able to behave most creatively only if he or she sees ways in which that company's problem is different from problems he or she has encountered in other companies, and act on what he or she perceives, rather than acting automatically on problems he or she knows how to solve. Prior experience can move the Self system automatically, often with minimal processing by the mind (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Reenactment of old behavioral patterns without regard for changed circumstances is at the root of what Langer calls "mindlessness" (1997), which is antithetical to creativity.

Seeing the past as the present, with the inability to see current circumstances as they are, is particularly difficult for those who suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Van Der Kolk (2014) suggests that people with this disorder are often suspended in time: the threat of the past is still in the present. Their plight is an accentuated version of what many of us experience, as we carry out action based on what we perceive in our minds rather than in the world. Lightening the weight of experience can allow nonmindless, noncompulsive action on what is there, rather than what is in the past, or what we already know how to act upon.

IMPROVING CREATIVITY

Most creativity-development workshops have creative process at their center, and often the process is illustrated by working on a creative product relevant to a particular domain. In this chapter we suggest a different way to improve creativity: by cultivating accurate perceptions of the Self and the world. The three aspects of self-experience that we have discussed, which impede creativity—the strain of self-deception, the weight of the Narrative Self, and the weight of the Experiential self—can be reduced by different methods. All parts of the Self interact, and therefore all the methods will affect all the parts. The optimal configuration of Self with regards to creativity, with little self-deception (distance between Narrative and Experiential Self), and little Experiential and Narrative baggage is shown in Fig. 19.2.



FIGURE 19.2 **Creative self.**

Self-deception is best addressed by observation: of thoughts, of emotions, and, most importantly, of behaviors. Observation of behaviors is particularly relevant when the self acts in a manner incongruent with self-narratives. Working on the weight of the Narrative Self is perhaps best accomplished by cultivating a multiplicity of flexible self-narratives. The most difficult of the three—the weight of the Experiential Self—can be best addressed by mindfulness: both Western mindfulness and Eastern meditation-based mindfulness.

Western mindfulness techniques are based on work by Langer (1989, 1997, 2005, 2009); they focus on making novel distinctions about objects in one's awareness, including the Self. By requiring a multiplicity of categorizations, past categories can be widened and changed, to focus the perceptual system on what is there. By contrast, the aim of Eastern meditation methods is for the Self to become less affected by messages from the Experiential Self (Djikic, 2014). Usually, when our body sends our mind a message, for instance, a message of anxiety from which it is difficult to escape, or a message of an urge to do X, we are taken up into our anxiety or we do X. When a message of this kind occurs while we are meditating, we let it first come into the mind, and then let it pass out of the mind. One might have reservations about this method because it grew from a cultural attitude that emotions are destructive and increase suffering. Stoicism in the West had much in common with this tradition.

More recent understanding of emotions is that they derive from our Experiential Self and let us know that when an event in the world affects a goal or concern, we need to attend to it (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 2014). It is principally the emotions that become stuck in the past such as chronic anxiety states and depression that need to be enabled to pass out of the mind, so that they are less likely to keep going round in there. In this way mindfulness has become an important component of psychological therapies for anxiety states and depression (see, e.g., Szabo, Long, Villatte, & Hayes, 2015). In this way the I and the Self can become less weighed down by the insistence of the Experiential Self. Both types of mindfulness, therefore, can enable clearer perception and acting on present rather than past categorizations (Djikic, 2014). As such both of them are likely to allow the Self to act more creatively on the world. A recent meta-analysis by Lebuda, Zabelina, and Karwowski (2016) discovered a small-to-medium effect size relationship between mindfulness and creativity, which has been shown to be not only correlational but causal as well.

CONCLUSIONS

Creativity is often seen as extraordinary, even magical. Yet at root it is perhaps the most basic of all phenomena—an ability to see and act on the Self and the world as it is, not as feared or wished for. Developmental theories of creativity often focus on what needs to be done externally to foster creativity. Here we address what needs to be done internally to foster creative thinking about newly changed events when they occur. Reducing self-deception through observation, maintaining a flexible Narrative Self, and cultivating mindfulness to reduce the weight of perpetuities in the Experiential Self might not seem as appealing as creativity workshops that promise 3 hours of fun and a brand new creative you. Work on oneself is lengthy and can at times be frustrating, but it may open doors to creativity to help worthwhile action in the world. As Voyagers made weary by holding apart the heavy suitcases of our Narrative Self and our Experiential Self, we can gently relax. We can allow the suitcases to come closer; we can take out and discard some of the more heavily weighing contents and, as we feel less weary, we can explore the world outside and the world within not as how we would like them to be, not as they have been, but as how they are.

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